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Abstract: Although virtual worlds have existed in some form for several years, it is only 
recently that the phrase has begun to seem truly accurate, with many users increasingly 
choosing to live the primary part of their days logged into a virtual world.  While virtual 
worlds are causing us to rethink how we view relationships and communications, they are 
also increasingly coming into conflict with our prior conceived notions of property law.  
With virtual worlds facing an escalating number of conflicts over property ownership, it 
is becoming imperative that the status of virtual property be addressed to ensure the 
continued growth of virtual worlds and their nascent, booming economies.   
In this Article, I examine the current conflicts over property rights within virtual 
worlds and offer a solution to the current problems. Although the status quo is untenable, 
I show that neither property law nor contract law can provide an exclusive solution to the 
current conflict.  Instead, I argue that virtual worlds and their unique characteristics call 
for the creation of a new type of property interest, which I call the virtual easement.  
Combining features of both property and contract law, the virtual easement allows for 
sufficient user property protections as well as maintaining virtual world companies’ 
control over their worlds. If established, the virtual easement should allow for continued 
growth of virtual world economies with a minimum of governmental interference.  I 
conclude with a discussion of possible policy concerns relating to the establishment of 
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I. Introduction 
 At the end of April, 2006, Marc Bragg won a tract of land called Taessot in an 
auction.1 Shortly after learning that he had won the property, however, the previous 
owner informed him that there had been a procedural error during the auction. As a 
result, the sale was void, and the money Bragg had transferred to the owner was supposed 
to be returned.2 Yet, after several weeks, not only had Bragg not received his promised 
refund, but the prior owner had allegedly converted other pieces property that Bragg 
owned, including money, other tracts of land, and even Bragg’s small fireworks 
business.3 Worse, the prior owner then auctioned off the confiscated property to “the 
highest bidder.”4 Understandably, Bragg responded to this by filing suit against Taessot’s 
prior owner for conversion, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment.5 Although such 
events come across as entirely ordinary, there is one fact that makes Bragg’s case quite 
unique. 
None of Bragg’s property actually exists.6 
Rather, to be more specific, all of his property is virtual property,7 existing in the 
virtual world Second Life.8 
                                                 
1 Complaint at 20, Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., No. 06-08711 (Pa. Chester County Ct. Com. Pl. Oct. 6, 
2006), http://lawy-ers.com/BraggvLinden_Complaint.pdf. 
2 Id. at 20-21. 
3 Id.  
4 Id. at 22. 
5 Id. at 39, 42, 43. 
6 Kathleen Craig, Second Life Land Deal Goes Sour, WIRED, May 18, 2006, available at 
http://www.wired.com/news/culture/0,70909-0.html; Tateru Nino, Bragg vs. Linden Lab—The Story so 
Far, Second Life Insider, Jan. 27, 2007, SECOND LIFE INSIDER, 
http://www.secondlifeinsider.com/2007/01/27/bragg-vs-linden-lab-the-story-so-far/. 
7 The exact definition of virtual property remains somewhat nebulous, see generally F. Gregory Lastowka 
& Dan Hunter, The Laws of the Virtual Worlds 92 CAL. L. REV. 1 (2004) [hereinafter Laws] (discussing 
prior and current conceptions of virtual property), especially since all visible/accessible personal or real 
property within a virtual world is nothing more than code, but I believe Joshua A.T. Fairfield’s definition is 
the most accurate currently. “This [particular] kind of code is designed to act more like land or chattel than 
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 Although forms of virtual worlds9 have existed in some form for several years, it 
is only recently that the phrase has begun to seem truly accurate. An evolution of online 
communities like LamdaMOO10 and Habitat,11 virtual worlds became particularly visible 
to the general world with the advent of Massively Multiplayer Online Role-Playing 
Games (MMORPGs) in the mid-to-late 1990s.12 These virtual worlds, many of which 
were based on fantasy or science fiction,13 exploded in population over the following 
years, with some virtual worlds possessing hundreds of thousands or even millions of 
                                                                                                                                                 
ideas. It pervades the internet and comprises many of the most important online resources. Often this kind 
of code makes up the structural components of the internet itself. Domain names, URLs (uniform resource 
locators), websites, email accounts, and entire virtual worlds are all examples of this . . . type of code. They 
are rivalrous. If one person owns and controls them, others do not. They are persistent. Unlike the software 
on your computer, they do not go away when you turn your computer off. And they are interconnected. 
Other people can interact with them. This kind of code I term “virtual property.” Joshua A.T. Fairfield, 
Virtual Property, 85 B.U. L. Rev. 1047, 1049-50 (2005) (internal citations omitted). 
8 SECOND LIFE, http://secondlife.com/; see also What Is Second Life?, http://secondlife.com/whatis/ (last 
visited Jul. 18, 2007) (discussing the structure, size, and economics of the world); What Is There?, 
http://www.there.com/help.html (last visited Jul. 18, 2007) (describing the mechanics of another virtual 
world, There.com). 
9 Again, while the term virtual world is somewhat imprecise, see Edward Castronova, The Right to Play, in 
THE STATE OF PLAY: LAW, GAMES, AND VIRTUAL WORLDS 68, 71-73 (Jack M. Balkin & Beth Simone 
Noveck, eds., 2006) [hereinafter Right to Play] (describing some aspects of virtual worlds, or, as he calls 
them, synthetic worlds), I take the term to apply to any persistent, online environment with internal 
structures, defined boundaries, communication between players, and the ability for a user to ‘possess’ or 
control virtual property. Notably, this is a narrower definition than many people use, see F. Gregory 
Lastowka & Dan Hunter, Virtual Worlds: A Primer, in THE STATE OF PLAY: LAW, GAMES, AND VIRTUAL 
WORLDS 17 (2006) [hereinafter Primer], (referring to the online system LamdaMoo as a virtual world even 
though it is impossible for users to have possessions within the system), but I believe that there are 
significant difference between those systems/games/worlds that have all four attributes and those which do 
not. To wit, those systems/games/worlds which lack one or more of the five attributes are better defined as 
online communities. This paper applies only to property within virtual worlds, however. 
10 A particularly famous Multi-User Dungeon (MUD), LamdaMOO is a persistent online community in the 
form of an eternally active chat room. See LamdaMOO: An Introduction, http://lambdamoo.info/ (last 
visited Jul. 18, 2007). Notably, LamdaMOO, like many MUDs, is entirely text-based. 
11 A “multi-player online virtual environment” that had that visual representations of users (avatars). Chip 
Morningstar and F. Randall Farmer, The Lessons of Lucasfilm’s Habitat (1991), available at 
http://www.fudco.com/chip/lessons.html. 
12 Admittedly, while there may have been smaller virtual worlds in existence previously , Meridian 59, 
launched in 1995, was “the game that started the recent explosion of [virtual worlds].” Edward Castronova, 
Virtal Worlds: A First-Hand Account of Market and Society on the Cyberian Frontier, (Ctr for Econ. 
Studies & Ifo Inst. For Econ Research, Working Paper No. 618, 2001) [hereinafter Cyberian], available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=294828. Similarly, Ultima Online, launched in 1997, 
was “the first commercially successfully [online] role-playing game.” Brad King, Gamers Click Home for 
Holidays, WIRED, Dec. 11, 2002, available at http://www.wired.com/news/games/0,2101,56759,00.html. 
13 Primer, supra note 9. 
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subscribers.14 Additionally, the variety of virtual worlds has also increased over the last 
several years. While many virtual worlds continue to have a fantasy or science fiction 
setting that largely revolves around player versus player combat 15 or the fulfillment of a 
quest,16 an increasing number eschew those forms to focus primarily on social 
interaction.17 
 Although one reason for people to become involved in a virtual world may well 
be escapism from the real world into a fictitious environment, it would be unfair to 
suggest that virtual worlds are just games.18 In many cases, virtual worlds are emerging 
as full societies. When the company which owns a virtual world has promulgated 
unpopular rules and requirements that users must follow, groups of users have banded 
together within the world to stage protests.19 Similarly, the finances of individual worlds 
have exploded20 to the point where some not only have floating21 and fixed exchange 
rates with the U.S. Dollar,22 but also economic controls have been established to insure 
                                                 
14 Id. See also MMOGCHART.COM, http://www.mmogchart.com/ (last visited Jul. 18, 2007) (showing 
subscriber statistics for many MMORPGs for the last decade).  
15 See, e.g., WORLD OF WARCRAFT; STAR WARS GALAXIES. 
16 See, e.g., FINAL FANTASY XI. 
17 See, e.g., THE SIMS ONLINE; THERE.COM; SECOND LIFE; see also Primer, supra note 9. 
18 Darren Levin, A Virtual Escape from Reality, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Mar. 1, 2007, 
http://www.smh.com.au/news/games/a-virtual-escape-from-reality/2007/02/28/1172338633058.html. 
19 See, e.g., Posting of James Grimmelmann to LawMeme, http://research.yale.edu/lawmeme/ (Sept. 21, 
2003, 21:20 EST) (Discussing the “tax revolt” within Second Life that involved avatars clothing 
themselves in American icons, wearing shirts that said “Born Free: Taxed to Death,” and the promulgation 
by users of “Don’t Tread on Me Billboards” throughout the world). 
20 Ania Lichtarowicz, Virtual Kingdom Richer than Bulgaria, BBC NEWS, Mar, 29, 2002, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/1899420.stm (stating that Everquest had then become the 77th 
richest country in the world, between Russia and Bulgaria). More recently, virtual worlds have been 
declared to represent more than U.S. $1 billion total. Who Wants to Be a Virtual Millionaire, THE 
INDEPENDENT (U.K.), Mar. 24, 2007, http://news.independent.co.uk/sci_tech/article2387853.ece. 
21 LindeX: Market Data, https://secure-web9.secondlife.com/currency/market.php (last visited Jul. 18, 
2007). 
22 Press Release, There, Inc., There, Inc. Delivers a Brave New Online World to Consumers (Oct. 27, 
2003), http://www.there.com/pr_officialLaunch.html. 
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the stability of the economies of individual worlds.23 Such innovations have resulted in 
scholars studying the economics of virtual worlds.24 Similarly, people have begun to 
spend such a large percentage of their lives within virtual worlds25 that users’ avatars 
frequently “marry” other avatars, with some of those marriages extending into our analog 
world.26 Virtual worlds are also increasingly the site for professional and political 
meetings as well, with scholars and presidential candidates giving press conferences and 
town halls ‘in-world’ over the last few months.27 Finally, and most importantly for the 
purposes of this essay, all users of virtual worlds acquire virtual property simply by 
entering the world, ranging from holdings as small as their avatar and the initial 
items/currency distributed by companies upon entering the world to real and personal 
virtual property holdings worth in excess of U.S. $1 million.28 Additionally, thanks to the 
increased complexity and richness of the Internet today,29 it has become commonplace 
for users to trade virtual property since, at base, all virtual property is merely code and 
therefore easily transferable.30  
                                                 
23 LindeX: Billing and Trading Limits, https://secure-web9.secondlife.com/currency/describe-limits.php 
(last visited Jul. 18, 2007). 
24 See, e.g, Cyberian, supra note 12 (studying the economics of the virtual world Everquest). See also, 
Capitalism 2.0, http://randolfe.typepad.com/randolfe/ (Jan. 23, 2007) (arguing that the Second Life 
economy is based on a virtual real estate bubble). 
25 See, e.g., Laws, supra note 7, at 6 (stating that the average user of Everquest spent twenty hours per week 
within that virtual world). 
26 Id. at 28. 
27 See John Bringardner, IP’s Brave New World, LAW.COM, Feb. 1, 2007, 
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1170237755271 (discussing 7th Circuit Judge Richard Posner 
attending a conference sponsored by Creative Commons within Second Life to promote his new book); 
Mike Miliard, Using the Web to Stop a War, THE PHOENIX (BOSTON), Mar. 14, 2007, available at 
http://www.thephoenix.com/article_ektid35565.aspx (noting that former 2008 presidential candidate Mark 
Warner hosted a “town-hall style meeting last summer in Second Life”). 
28 Who Wants to Be a Virtual Millionaire, supra note 20. 
29 A development that some have dubbed Web 2.0. Tim O’Reilly, What is Web 2.0, O’REILLY MEDIA, Sept. 
30, 2005, http://www.oreillynet.com/pub/a/oreilly/tim/news/2005/09/30/what-is-web-20.html. 
30 David Nelmark, Virtual Property: The Challenges of Regulating Intangible, Exclusionary Property 
Interests such as Domain Names, 3 NW. J. TECH & INTELL. PROP. 1 (2004). Of course, as with all things on 
the Internet, this increased distribution comes with increased dangers. See MARGARET J. RADIN, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE INTERNET 182 (2004).  
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 Due to these innovations, however, actions within the universe of virtual worlds,31 
can reach “far beyond local boundaries”32 and impact the real world in significant ways.33 
As virtual worlds become increasingly commodified and users make such worlds their 
primary place of business, the revenues generated from trades, sales, and purchases in-
world represent income that governments may regard as taxable.34 Similarly, the theft of 
a piece of virtual property, for which a user paid some amount of real world-currency, 
represents the total loss of the value of that property—if the hoverboard I effectively paid 
U.S. $30 for is taken from me, my total personal assets are now reduced by U.S. $30 in 
both the digital and analog realms.35 And of course, if a user chooses to make interacting 
within a virtual world her full-time job, it is not unexpected that she can exchange her 
virtual world currency for real world currency in such numbers as to make “playing” 
within a virtual world ultimately more profitable than working any number of real-world 
jobs.36  
 Given both their relatively recent origins and the inherent difficulties courts and 
legislatures have had addressing the internet and intellectual property generally,37 the 
                                                 
31 A group which might be collectively called “the Metaverse” after the virtual world discussed in Neal 
Stephenson’s book, Snow Crash, which has become something of a literary touchstone for scholars of 
virtual worlds. See Jack M. Balkin & Beth Simone Noveck, Introduction, in STATE OF PLAY, supra note 9, 
at 1, 1.  
32 LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 9 (2004) [hereinafter FREE CULTURE]. 
33 See The Right to Play, supra note 9, at 72. 
34Id. at 76. See also Cory Ondrejka, Escaping the Gilded Cage: User-Created Content and Building the 
Metaverse, in STATE OF PLAY, supra note 9, at 158, 163; Leandra Lederman, “Stranger than Fiction”: 
Taxing Virtual Worlds, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1620 (2007). 
35 See F. Gregory Lastowka & Dan Hunter, Virtual Crime, in STATE OF PLAY, supra note 9, at 121, 126 
[hereinafter Virtual Crime] (arguing that it is incorrect to think that the theft of virtual property has as little 
impact on the real world as the death of a user’s character within a video game).  
36 Indeed, the ability of virtual worlds to effectively ‘create’ value makes them one of the more fascinating 
innovations of the web. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE 12 (2006) [hereinafter CODE]. 
37 See Caroline Humphrey & Katherine Verdery, Introduction: Raising Questions about Property, in 
PROPERTY IN QUESTION 1, 9 (Caroline Humphrey and Katherine Verdery, eds. 2004) [hereinafter Raising 
Questions about Property] (noting that the fact that there is rarely scarcity present makes solving 
intellectual property disputes difficult); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (holding that it was within 
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legal status of virtual worlds remains in a great deal of flux.38 Prior attempts to apply law 
to cyberspace even in discrete circumstances have proven difficult, with court decisions 
often coming down to a choice between several outcomes, all of them negative, with the 
result that prior case law on related topics is a poor guide.39 Also, commentators and 
professionals have been unable to find an accurate prism through which virtual worlds 
may be analyzed.40 Indeed, the best analogy/analytical tool at present is the idea that 
virtual worlds are the internet equivalent of the nineteenth century company town,41 but 
this analogy is bestrought with problems.42 This lack of clear-cut analogies to real-world 
institutions or principles has resulted in general confusion within the scholarship as well, 
with commentators frequently misunderstanding virtual worlds,43 having difficultly 
defining aspects of the worlds,44 or reversing course on the nature of virtual property and 
virtual worlds.45 
                                                                                                                                                 
Congress’s power to enlarge the duration of copyright by twenty years); Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace 
and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL. F. 207, 209 (stating that there was no law of cyberspace). 
38 See Daniel C. Miller, Note, Determining Ownership in Virtual Worlds: Copyright and License 
Agreements, 22 REV. LITIG 435 (2003) (discussing the many questions revolving around license and 
copyright agreements in virtual spaces and the conflicting opinions over user rights) 
39 See Fairfield, supra note 7, at 1079 (claiming that although the decision in Intel v. Hamidi concerning the 
possibility of trespass within a server was “deeply unsatisfying,” the lower court decision in that case was 
similarly bad); United States v. Thomas, 74 F. 3d 701 (6th Cir. 1996) (Dodging the issue of whether 
cyberspace qualifies as a community for legal purposes).  
40 See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Law and Liberty in Virtual Worlds, in STATE OF PLAY, supra note 9, at 86, 98-
99 [hereinafter Law and Liberty]. 
41 See Jason S. Zack, Comment, The Ultimate Company Town: Wading in the Digital Marsh of Second Life, 
10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 25 (2007). 
42 See Kevin W. Saunders, Virtual Worlds—Real Courts, 52 VILL. L. REV. 187, 203-04 (2007) (arguing that 
the analogy is not particularly apt given that virtual worlds do not have the company actually taking over 
government functions as happened in Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946)). 
43 See Andrew E. Jankowich, Property & Democracy in Virtual Worlds, 11 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 173, 
211 (2005) (claiming that Second Life gives its users actual property rights, despite the contrary terms of its 
End User License Agreement). 
44 See Law and Liberty, in STATE OF PLAY, supra note 9, at 106 (having difficulty explaining how speech 
and conduct work within virtual worlds versus in the analog world). 
45 Compare I. Trotter Hardy, The Proper Legal Regime for Cyberspace, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 993, 994, 
1019-25 (1994) (arguing that cyberspace should be governed primarily by contract and custom) with I. 
Trotter Hardy, Property (and Copyright) in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 217 (1996) (arguing that a 
proper rule regime is needed generally in cyberspace). 
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 While such issues would be problematic even in a system that was functioning 
perfectly, the general confusion about the law of virtual worlds is particularly pressing 
given that legal problems relating to such worlds are, as was predicted, rapidly 
multiplying.46 While there have been a handful of lawsuits in the past,47 the number and 
risk of lawsuits specifically over virtual property appears to be increasing. Within Second 
Life, beyond the pending lawsuit between Bragg and Second Life’s owner, Linden Lab, 
another lawsuit is brewing over an ‘eviction’ from a piece of virtual property.48 Also, a 
large number of users within Second Life are threatening a class action lawsuit due to the 
company’s release within the world of a tool which can make copying of their 
possessions substantially easier.49 Additionally, several virtual worlds have experienced 
lawsuits relating to the issue of whether virtual property can be sold by users over Ebay.50 
Finally, one user is even seeking to sue another user for theft, with no indication of 
whether the suit will be handled in Second Life or in the analog world.51 With 
commodification of virtual worlds accelerating as more and more entities recognize the 
                                                 
46 See Jankowich, supra note 43, at 185 (claiming that users will increasingly turn to courts to seek legal 
redress for their grievances where owners of virtual worlds prove intransigent); Molly Stephens, Note, 
Sales of In-Game Assets: An Illustration of the Continuing Failure of Intellectual Property Law to Protect 
Digital-Content Creators, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1513 (2002); William V. Vetter, Preying on the Web: Tax 
Collection in the Virtual World, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 649 (2001) (discussing concerns about how to 
properly tax assets accrued from commerce within the Internet). 
47 The most famous of which was the BlackSnow Interactive case, “the first dispute over virtual property to 
make it to the real-world court system,” though no final decision was reached as the defendants simply 
ceased paying their attorneys at the beginning of court proceedings. Laws, supra note 7, at 50-51; see also 
Julian Dibbell, Owned! Intellectual Property in the Age of eBayers, Gold Farmers, and Other Enemies of 
the Virtual State—Or, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the End-User License Agreement, in 
STATE OF PLAY, supra note 9, at 137 (discussing how the BlackSnow case altered views of End-User 
License Agreements generally). 
48 Pixeleen Mistral, Island Land Scamming, Anyone?, SECOND LIFE INSIDER, Feb. 18, 2007, 
http://www.secondlifeherald.com/slh/2007/02/island_land_sca.html. 
49 Antone Gonslaves, Second Life Shop Owners Threaten Suit Against Virtual World's Creator, 
INFORMATION WEEK, Nov. 15, 2006, 
http://www.informationweek.com/news/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=194400314. 
50 See, e.g., Posting of Dan Hunter to Terranova, http://terranova.blogs.com/terra_nova/ (Dec. 18, 2006).  
51 Amy-May Elliott, Avatar vs. Avatar – The First Second Life Lawsuit, POCKET-LINT.COM, Jul. 6, 2007, 
http://www.pocket-lint.co.uk/news/news.phtml/8570/9594/Avatar-Sues-Second-Life-Lawsuit.phtml  
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commercial potential these spaces represent,52 these trends are likely to continue into the 
foreseeable future. 
 Additionally, and somewhat ironically, the situation has been exacerbated by the 
promulgation of more user rights by Second Life. While virtually all virtual worlds make 
their users agree to their terms of service (ToS) by clicking through an End-User License 
Agreement (EULA), practically all EULA’s state that users have only a license to use the 
game, with the companies retaining all rights and title in all circumstances.53 On the 
advice of legal scholars, however, Linden Lab decided in 2003 that it would grant users 
limited intellectual property rights within Second Life,54 altering its ToS to state that 
users “retain copyright and other intellectual property rights with respect to Content you 
                                                 
52 See Ondrejka, supra note 34, at 170 (“Currently MMORPG developers are in a race that they cannot 
possibly win as they try to stay ahead of the users who choose to commodify their games’ content and 
currency.”). 
53 See e.g., World of Warcraft Terms of Service (Jan. 11, 2007), 
http://www.worldofwarcraft.com/legal/termsofuse.html (“All rights and title in and to the Program and the 
Service (including without limitation any user accounts, titles, computer code, themes, objects, characters, 
character names, stories, dialogue, catch phrases, locations, concepts, artwork, animations, sounds, musical 
compositions, audio-visual effects, methods of operation, moral rights, any related documentation, 
"applets" incorporated into the Program, transcripts of the chat rooms, character profile information, 
recordings of games played on the Program, and the Program client and server software) are owned by 
Blizzard or its licensors. The Program and the Service are protected by United States and international 
laws. The Program and the Service may contain certain licensed materials, and Blizzard's licensors may 
enforce their rights in the event of any violation of this Agreement.”); Sony Online Entertainment LLC 
Terms of Service, http://www.station.sony.com/termsofservice.vm (last visited Jul. 18, 2007) (“The 
Station, including, without limitation, all SOE Communication Features, contains copyrighted material, 
trademarks and other proprietary information including, without limitation, text, software, photographs, 
video, graphics, music and sound, and the entire contents of The Station and each area contained therein are 
copyrighted as a collective work under the United States copyright laws. SOE owns a copyright in the 
selection, coordination, arrangement and enhancement of such content. You may not modify, publish, 
transmit, participate in the transfer or sale, create derivative works, or in any way exploit, any of the 
content contained on The Station (including, without limitation, content that The Station enables you to 
download) without the express written permission of SOE and the copyright owner. In the event of any 
permitted copying, redistribution or publication of copyrighted material, no changes in or deletion of author 
attribution, trademark, legend or copyright notice shall be made. The downloading of copyrighted material 
from The Station is allowed by you only for your own use. You acknowledge that SOE and/or third-party 
content providers remain the owners of all materials posted on The Station, and that you do not acquire any 
of those ownership rights by downloading copyrighted materials.”). 
54 Press Release, Linden Lab, Second Life Residents To Own Digital Creations (Nov. 14, 2003), 
http://lindenlab.com/press/releases/03_11_14 (“Changes to Second Life's Terms of Service now recognize 
the ownership of in-world content by the subscribers who make it. The revised TOS allows subscribers to 
retain full intellectual property protection for the digital content they create, including characters, clothing, 
scripts, textures, objects and designs.). 
Slaughter 11
create in Second Life, to the extent that you have such rights under applicable law.”55 
Considering that Second Life’s EULA still states that “Linden Lab retains ownership of 
the account and related data, regardless of intellectual property rights you may have in 
content you create or otherwise,” the ultimate result of this policy change has been to 
further muddy the situation, with users having more reason to believe they are the actual 
owners of the virtual property they possess, even while companies believe they continue 
to have all ownership rights within their virtual worlds.56 
A prime reason for these increasing legal dilemmas, however, is the fact that the 
relationship between users and companies in terms of ownership of virtual property is 
uncertain. Yet, the current contract law-based regimes do not seem to offer any solutions 
either. While the EULA’s might appear to be solid protections against user lawsuits and 
provide a good vehicle to determine which parties own what pieces of property within 
virtual worlds, many commentators doubt that courts will fully uphold the entirety of 
many EULA’s given how greatly they tilt the balance in favor of the owners of the virtual 
worlds.57 In truth, the idea that users are free to participate in virtual worlds, and in some 
cases even create new content,58 but not be able to keep the items the users spent real 
money for and possess is anathema to our general societal conceptions of how labor and 
property work. It is thus quite conceivable that courts will strike down the single 
instrument governing virtual worlds.59 Given that the general law of licenses itself has 
                                                 
55 Second Life Terms of Service, http://secondlife.com/corporate/tos.php (last visited Jul. 18, 2007). 
56 Id. 
57 See, e.g., Laws, supra note 7, at 51; Right to Play, in STATE OF PLAY, supra note 9, at 76 (“Only time 
will tell how robust all the EULA’s are, . . . .”); Bobby Glusko, Note, Tales of the (Virtual) City: Governing 
Property Disputes in Virtual Worlds, 22 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 507 (2007). 
58 Jack M. Balkin, Virtual Liberty: Freedom to Design and Freedom to Play in Virtual Worlds, 90 VA. L. 
REV. 2043, 2047 (2004) [hereinafter Virtual Liberty]. 
59 See discussion infra Part II.A.2-3. 
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been something of a confusing jumble for decades, however,60 it may not be feasible to 
simply begin declaring that the licenses conferred on users through the EULA’s 
automatically come with property rights over all items/code/money that the users 
accumulate within virtual worlds, nor is it at all likely that any game company would 
voluntarily choose to limit its profits and control of the game world. Indeed, given how 
poorly law seems to fit virtual worlds in general,61 there seem to be no easy answers to 
the virtual property dilemma at present. 
 Given the mounting legal issues that virtual worlds face, and the apparent failure 
of contracts to provide the basis for a working regime of virtual property ownership, it 
seems inevitable that some degree of real-world law must overtly be brought into the 
Metaverse by officially establishing the legal status of virtual property. Although this 
path may not be the ideal solution given the many negative side effects of legal rules and 
regimes,62 it seems to be the only option that can provide stability and clarity to the 
question of who owns virtual property, as continued uncertainty will only breed further 
chaos and an exponentially increasing number of lawsuits.63  
A number of major obstacles will need to be overcome if property law is to enter 
the Metaverse, though. Most importantly, legal guarantees have to be light and flexible 
enough that the core values of virtual worlds, such as the ability of companies to alter/re-
                                                 
60 See Alfred F. Conard, An Analysis of Licenses in Land, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1942) [hereinafter 
Analysis]. 
61 See Bill Maurer, Cyberspatial Properties: Taxing Questions about Proprietary Regimes, in PROPERTY IN 
QUESTION, supra note 37, at 297, 315 (2004); Warren E. Agin & Scott N. Kumis, A Framework for 
Understanding Electronic Information Transactions, 15 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 277, 329 (2005). 
62 E.g. increased complexity, rigidity, hierarchy, etc. Admittedly, some skeptics of the wisdom of bringing 
law into virtual worlds believe that it should be relevant in a limited fashion, but only where “there [is] a 
real world right or interest at stake and even then there should be some reluctance.” Saunders, supra note 
42, at 240. 
63 Laws, supra note 7, at 50-51. 
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code the worlds and continued existence of the fantasy aspects64 of the worlds, will not be 
significantly damaged.65 To this extent, mandating full property rights within virtual 
worlds could do grave, possibly even fatal, damage to their unique characteristics and 
attributes. The jurisdictional complexities associated with most things on the internet 
must also be addressed, including the issues of what claims real-world courts have 
jurisdiction over,66 whether and how virtual world property can be taxed,67 and which 
courts can hear claims arising from virtual worlds. Even more critically, which 
jurisdiction’s laws will govern within a given virtual world, where the company may be 
based in California but users can be playing anywhere in the world? Finally, the virtual 
worlds will themselves have to deal with the transition period into accepting the new 
regime of virtual property, but it is important that this transition not be so difficult or 
stressful that the continued growth of the Metaverse is inhibited, ideally through some 
version of a finite menu of different options from which companies can choose. 
 At base, however, it must be remembered that the idea that law should have some 
sway is not particularly controversial given the nature of prior interactions between the 
law and emerging technologies. For good or for ill, it is impossible to fully separate 
virtual worlds from the real world—every avatar is controlled by a person in the real 
world, and the transactions and interactions within the world cannot help but trigger 
                                                 
64 Or, as it is sometimes called, the “game conceit.” 
65 Richard A. Bartle, Virtual Worldliness, in STATE OF PLAY, supra note 9, at 31, 34, 43. 
66 See, e.g., Farnaz Alemi, An Avatar’s Day in Court: A Proposal for Obtaining Relief and Resolving 
Disputes in Virtual World Games, 2007 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 6; Kurt Hunt, Note, This Land Is Not Your 
Land: Second Life, Copybot, and the Looming Question of Virtual Property Rights, 9 TEX. REV. ENT. & 
SPORTS L. 141 (2007); 
67 See Bryan T. Camp, The Play’s the Thing: A Theory of Taxing Virtual Worlds, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1 
(2007). 
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effects in the real world.68 Additionally, while the prospect of giving legal salience to 
virtual property is daunting for practical and theoretical reasons, it is common to see such 
obstacles when faced with new technologies—indeed courts have struggled greatly to 
address the legal status of both movies and video games in the past.69 Yet, simply 
surrendering and leaving virtual worlds and virtual property outside the realm of the law 
appears to be the worst option by far, as evidenced by the problems wrought by attempts 
to leave the Internet “law-free” for a time during the previous decade. If law could be 
applied to the Internet due to concerns about the status of its users, it is logical that law 
should have some degree of power over virtual property.70  
As I will argue in this essay, there must be a new kind of property interest created 
for property possessed by users of virtual worlds, one that lies between contract and 
property, combining the consideration and restitution damages of contract and the in rem 
theory of property. More precisely, the property interest in question exists on this 
spectrum somewhere between the license and the easement, comprising elements of both: 
the transferability and eternal nature of the easement and the concept of creating 
irrevocability through expenditures of capital and labor and the privilege to not be a 
trespasser in the realm of another of the license. In effect, the interest is a super-license or 
a lesser easement, though I suggest that the proper name is a virtual easement. 
This essay will advance the argument for this new property interest online by first 
discussing the failure of the status quo within virtual worlds and the need for a new 
                                                 
68 See Virtual Liberty, supra note 58, at 2090 (suggesting that the more that virtual worlds are commodified 
and become “a nexus for transactions that have real-world values,” the harder it will be for law to ignore 
virtual worlds); Saunders, supra note 42, at 230. 
69 See Mutual Film Corp v. Industrial Comm. 236 U.S. 230 (1915); Interactive Digital Software 
Association v. St. Louis County, 329 F.3d 9523 (8th Cir. 2003). 
70 See John Hughes, The Internet and the Persistence of Law, 44 B.C. L. REV 359, 365-69 (2003). 
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rubric. Next, this piece will argue that neither contract nor property can perfectly control 
the rights and duties of virtual world creators and users with regard to virtual possessions, 
and that a new course is needed. With that established, this essay will then analyze the 
advantages of the virtual easement and its ability to map onto the form of virtual worlds. 
Next, this essay addresses several policy concerns associated with the promulgation of 
this new interest, including maintaining the sanctity of the game world, the risk of 
increasing judicial confusion, and jurisdictional concerns. Finally, this essay concludes 
by outlining a few areas of possible future research. 
 
II. The Failings of the Status Quo 
 As previously alluded to, the current relationship between users and companies in 
terms of virtual property is in a state of flux, even though some parties seem to believe 
that the current regimes established by EULA’s are, if nothing else, in little danger of 
breaking down in the near future.71 As this Part will argue, however, many aspects of the 
current system appears both inefficient and untenable even in the medium-term, as the 
EULA’s are reestablishing an anachronistic, unfair, and potentially chaotic licensing 
system, giving the owners of virtual worlds too great an ability to harm users, damaging 
the economic potential of the worlds, and doing violence to moral conceptions of 
property.  
 Before this topic can be discussed in detail, however, a brief discussion of the 
incentives facing companies and the framework of this paper is in order. Assuming that 
                                                 
71 See supra p. 6. 
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the companies, as profit-seeking enterprises,72 will be rational actors, a number of general 
statements can be made about the companies’ incentives. First, that the companies all 
desire to grow their market-share, and, to that end, will attempt to keep their virtual 
worlds fairly up-to-date in terms of technological advances to both virtual worlds and 
internet commerce generally.73 Similarly, the companies will seek to make all their 
profits sustainable, preferring moderate long-term gains over acting in such a way as to 
create high short-term gains but reduced long-term profits.74 To gain such sustainable 
profit and increased market-share, it is reasonable that companies will try to avoid 
needlessly angering users, but should instead accede to their requests wherever possible. 
 Of course, there are additional incentives at play to complicate matters. 
Companies, in the interest of sustaining profits, will want to not act in ways that reduces 
their ability to control and change their worlds, since such restrictions make efficient 
reorganizations and technological additions more difficult. For example, assume that 
users ask for, and receive, the right to have their land within a virtual world stay in the 
same place relative to other landmarks and to not be ejected for any reason. Following 
this grant, a given user acts in ways that anger his neighbors and disrupt the community 
generally, causing several other users to threaten to leave the virtual world unless the 
offending user is ejected or rehabilitated. Due to the rights that the company gave users, it 
cannot be certain of rectifying the situation, but must ask the user to accede to its requests 
and then basically hope for the best.  
                                                 
72 Admittedly, Linden Lab in particular claims to have been founded “to connect us all to an online world 
that advances the human condition,” suggesting motives besides pure profit. Given that investors have 
supported even that organization, however, it seems impossible for Linden Lab to desire to not make 
money. See About Linden Lab, http://lindenlab.com/about (last visited Jul. 18, 2007). 
73 Evidence of this can be seen in Sony’s adoption of Station Exchange in response to mass Ebay trading.  
See infra note 111. 
74 Granted, however, that a company may prefer short-term gains if it believes it is doomed to fail in the 
long-run. 
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 To be fair, the divergence of users’ and companies’ interests primarily occurs ex 
post any event or problem.  Before, or ex ante, a user signs up for membership in a virtual 
world, both the company and the user has an interest in thinking that users have some 
amount of rights. In terms of marketing, Linden Labs certainly benefits from users 
thinking their “second life” has rights analogous to their “first lives,” since this 
encourages users to be more interested in entering the virtual world and to spend more 
money in the virtual world.75  If a user thought all virtual world money was only play 
money, they might be willing to throw a few dollars into the world for fun, but would not 
seriously consider investing significant sums of money in world.  Once an incident has 
occurred where the company wants a user out of the virtual world, the user suddenly has 
a strong interest in process and property rights existing, while the virtual world just wants 
to make the user leave without effort or fanfare.76 Of course, in that situation, the 
company also wants to power to make the user leave without the company having to 
compensate the user in the process, since even compensation will require the company to 
spend time, effort, and money before the deviant user finally leaves the virtual world. 
As a result, while users may prefer maximum rights, the addition of many rights, 
property or otherwise, may make virtual worlds less governable. Indeed, in extreme 
cases, such as users having the absolute right to remain within a world upon entry in all 
circumstances, it may become impossible for companies to exercise any real measure of 
                                                 
75 Indeed, this seems to have been the rough belief of Marc Bragg. 
76 Admittedly, some scholars see this dichotomy as evidence a reason to prefer dealing with such problems 
after they occur or to set up terms that are more favorable to companies. Lucian A. Bebchuk and Richard 
A. Posner, Boilerplate in Consumer Contract: One-Sided Contracts in Competitive Consumer Markets, 104 
MICH. L. REV. 827, 828 (2006).  Yet, given the lack of information on the part of many users and the utility 
of using the current custom of defining the user-company relationship at the outset, it appears that ex ante 
agreements are vastly preferable in dealing with virtual worlds. See Lisa Bernstein, Formalism in 
Commercial Law: The Questionable Empirical Basis of Article 2's Incorporation Strategy: A Preliminary 
Study, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 710 (1999). 
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control over their worlds. Significantly, the degree to which companies are accustomed to 
having control over their own worlds is perhaps the most salient difference between 
analog land and digital land. While governments expect that individual property owners 
will have a significant degree of autonomy over their own land, game companies expect 
to be the final arbiter in terms of how digital land is used. This difference is critical for 
why developer incentives will match up with user interests less than analog developers 
incentives will match-up with analog property owners. Although game companies believe 
they have the right and duty to manage all the land in their world, analog developers 
neither desire nor have anywhere near the same amount power to modify and control land 
use. Game companies thus have an incentive to not grant any rights or interests that make 
their virtual worlds less governable, an incentive that naturally clashes with the incentives 
of users to have as many rights and interests as possible.77  
An additional complicating incentive is that companies will, in the interest of 
maximizing profit, want to make their virtual worlds open to the largest number of people 
possible. Activities that may offend users (such as graphic sexual imagery, racism, or 
radical political beliefs) may be disfavored by companies. Similarly, attempts to follow 
the rule of law of one country in particular may turn off users in different countries, 
encouraging companies to adopt a poly-national approach to real-world law by following 
the laws of as many states as possible.78   
                                                 
77 An understandable incentive for users to have, since they presumably want to get the maximum benefit 
possible from the money they spend to have the right to interact within virtual worlds. 
78 The companies will not treat all countries equally, of course. Appeasing the populations of countries with 
significant technological infrastructure and broad interest in virtual worlds (such as the United States, 
Japan, South Korea, and the European Union) will naturally take precedence over countries that lack broad-
based broadband access and have few potential virtual world users (such as much of Africa, central Asia, 
and the Middle East). 
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While specific companies may have more nuanced interests,79 these are the broad 
strokes of the companies’ incentives. Overall, the interests of the companies and users 
will largely align80—most things that the users want in terms of new tech or minor 
adjustments to how things work will be happily agreed to by the companies, since 
acquiescing in such requests makes it more likely that users will stay happy, continue to 
remain in a given virtual world, and encourage friends to join as well. Yet, there is a 
natural clash in terms of the property and, to a lesser degree, the speech rights of 
users81—companies will want to minimize the granting of additional rights due to 
concerns that further user rights and interests will impede efforts to mold and alter virtual 
worlds. While some enterprising virtual world may adopt increased property rights or 
personal rights, this has not happened yet, and the small number of full virtual world 
operators suggests that there may be some collusion in this regard.82 
 To a significant degree, developers of virtual worlds are in the same position as 
developers and common-interest communities (CIC’s) within the analog world.  When a 
developer or CIC has difficulty gaining information about potential renters or members, 
the developer or CIC will tend control access through mild exclusion strategies.83  These 
strategies are epitomized by a developer suggesting to a potential renter that his set of 
                                                 
79 Such as, at least potentially, Linden Lab. See supra note 72. 
80 A view that has generally been propagated by Prof. Robert C. Ellickson. See Generally ROBERT C. 
ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW (1991). 
81 Speech rights are less at issue since most virtual worlds seem reluctant to limit users’ speech since that 
may trigger an outburst of outrage at the restricting company. Additionally, users appear to have far more 
speech rights than property rights, though speech rights are far from unlimited. See Second Life 
Community Standards, http://secondlife.com/corporate/cs.php (last visited Jul. 17, 2007). 
82 The primary reason for this is that there is an extraordinarily small number of virtual world operators that 
are sizable enough to allow for users to accumulate significant assets.  Additionally, by all accounts, 
opening a major virtual world is a massive undertaking and requires significant investments of time, 
resources, and liquid capital.  Additionally, there are significant incentives for companies to not be the first 
to adopt new property rights. See infra note 256. 
83 Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Information Asymmetries and the Rights to Exclude, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1835, 
1898 (2006). 
Slaughter 20
condominiums are largely occupied by and designed for extroverted, clean citizens of 
upstanding moral character, thereby encouraging the renter, who knows better than all 
other persons whether he fits that description, to decline to rent such a condo if he does 
not feel he would enjoy or fit in with his neighbors.84 Virtual worlds effectively utilize a 
similar dynamic—endemic to the structure of virtual worlds is the idea that its users can 
interact according to the norms of the world, and problems arise frequently when a user 
refuses to follow accepted customs. In virtual world terms, hacking the system for 
personal gain is perhaps the best example of a gross violation of social norms, and 
developers and users interests are aligned in preventing such anti-social behavior. 
Yet, by the same token, developers of CIC’s and analog housing tend, like virtual 
world platform owners, to have different incentives than their communities on 
governance issues.  As noted by Professor Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, CIC’s and developers 
tend to establish any common amenities at the outset and eschew adding other such 
amenities down the road.85  The primary reason for this is that the addition of any new 
common amenity will be regarded differently by individuals within a building or a CIC, 
with some finding that the change benefits them and others discerning that the change 
leaves them worse off.86  The end result of such a mid-stream change is significant 
controversy, sometimes to the point that the peace and neighborliness of the community 
is severely harmed.87  In effect then, developers and CIC’s end up being strongly averse 
to change.88 
                                                 
84 Id. at 1851. 
85 Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Exclusionary Amenities in Residential Communities, 92 VA. L. REV. 437, 461 
n.74 (2006). 
86 Yoram Barzel & Tim R. Sass, The Allocation of Resources by Voting, 105 Q. J. ECON. 745, 764-65 
(1990) 
87 Id. 
88 Michael Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163, 1184-85 (1999) 
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Unfortunately, the same has proven to be true of virtual worlds.  Although some 
worlds have experienced significant change a moderate length of time after they were 
first opened to the public,89 the vast majority have not changed significantly in the 
interim, in large part because even minor “patches” tend to result in significant anger 
from users over how companies have “ruined” a feature of a virtual world.90 Not only 
does this mean that companies are gun-shy about embarking on major non-cosmetic 
renovations of an extant world, but it also makes companies loathe to trust users much 
like developers are afraid to give too much power to current occupants with regard to 
policy-making.91 Additionally, the relatively small number of major virtual worlds means 
that a company cannot make such a change without attracting significant attention from 
the Metaverse generally, with the result that one virtual world’s endorsement of more 
user rights places severe pressure on other worlds to follow suit, even if the change is a 
net negative for companies.92  This externality strongly encourages all companies to 
silently agree to refrain from making major changes to user rights.  Given that virtual 
worlds have been around for several years and are becoming massive economies in their 
own right, thereby further discouraging major changes given the increase in numbers of 
users, I thus assume that the failure to create property rights thus far means that property 
rights will not be established by companies without external pressure from courts or 
governments. 
 In terms of the general framework of this work, the primary information that we 
                                                 
89 Sony’s creation of Station Exchange and Second Life’s establishment of modest intellectual property 
rights being the primary events. See supra note 53; infra note 111. 
90 Richard A. Bartle, Virtual Worldliness, in STATE OF PLAY, supra note 9, at 44. 
91 Barzel & . Sass, supra note 86. 
92 While Second Life’s change has not forced the hand of other worlds yet, it has increased pressure on 
those worlds. 
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need to know in making effective virtual easements is largely economic. First, whether 
users will change the amount of time and effort they spend interacting within virtual 
worlds if some manner of property rights is established.  Second, are there any users that 
will refuse to make use of virtual worlds if property rights are established (a prospect that 
seems unlikely at present).  Finally, to what extent will establishing various kinds of 
property rights decrease the profits of virtual world operators.  While the exact contours 
of this data remains unknown, the present state of the Metaverse and the general 
incentives of users93 suggest the answers to these questions will provide evidence that 
some manner of property interest should be established.  
The lack of substantial empirical research on virtual worlds beyond a few 
economic studies also mandates that some assumptions be made.  First, it is assumed that 
users are profit-seeking and will not senselessly throw away money. While users may 
spend significant amounts of capital in pursuit of an experience, we can assume that the 
vast majority will not act irrationally or randomly. Additionally, we can assume that the 
economics of virtual worlds remains such that it can be profitable in the analog world to 
accumulate virtual property.  If the situation changes such that virtual property becomes 
worthless in terms of analog world money, the need for some property rights within 
virtual worlds will be decreased.  Admittedly, there still may be need for property rights 
from a position of wanting to preserve personal autonomy, but the economic reason is 
especially compelling.  Similarly, we must assume that there is some way to have general 
regulations across virtual worlds and across different countries—if every country insists 
on having a separate system of regulation, enforcement of so many different regimes may 
not be feasible.  More troubling would be if countries cannot find a way to make 
                                                 
93 See supra note 77. 
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companies abide by regulations; while there are options available for dealing with this 
risk,94 they may not be palatable politically in certain countries.  Finally, for the virtual 
easement to be established, there must be some interest on the part of users to have 
virtual property rights.  While users have expressed such a desire obliquely, there has 
been relatively little in the way of overt demands in this regard. 
 
A. Licenses to Play 
1. License Law 
In truth, it is somewhat surprising that owners of virtual worlds would make 
EULA’s the means of contracting with users given that license law itself has been itself 
quite confused for decades.95 The doctrine does seem fairly clear at first glance—
according to the Restatement, most licenses are revocable at any time,96 but when a 
licensee has “made expenditures of capital or labor in the exercise of his license in 
reasonable reliance upon representations by the licensor, as to the duration of the license, 
[he] is privileged to continue the use permitted by the license to the extent reasonably 
necessary to realize upon his expenditures,”97 and the license is deemed an executed 
license.98 Under the conventional view, this is a license on the right to continue having 
access to the resources and items reasonably necessary to realize one’s expenditures, and 
the licensor has not right to interfere. Moreover, an executed license is not revoked by the 
                                                 
94 See discussion infra Part V.C. 
95 See Analysis, supra note 60; Alfred F. Conard, The Privilege of Forcibly Ejecting an Amusement Patron, 
90 U. PA. L. REV 809, 811 (1942) [hereinafter Amusement Patron] 
96 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY § 519(1) (1944) (“Except as stated in Subsections (2), (3), and (4), a 
license is terminable at the will of the possessor of the land subject to it”). 
97 Id. at § 519(4). See, e.g., Cooke v. Ramponi, 239 P.2d 638 (Cal. 1952). 
98 HERBET HOVENKAMP & SHELDON F. KURTZ, THE LAW OF PROPERTY: AN INTRODUCTORY SURVEY 327 
(5th ed. 2001).  
Slaughter 24
licensor’s conveyance of the property the license is attached to. An executed license is 
thus on the property itself, rather than on the licensor.99  Yet, this clear-cut definition 
breaks down on closer analysis. Even discounting the fact that not all courts elect to 
follow the Restatement,100 it is far from clear exactly when the necessary amount of 
expenditures have taken place to turn an ordinary revocable license into an irrevocable 
executed one.101 The question of when a licensee can be said to have acted in “reasonable 
reliance upon representations from the licensor” is similarly unclear.102 Courts have 
responded to this confusion with some fairly outlandish decisions, such as holding that 
licenses are revocable but can only be revoked with reasonable cause or that revocation 
not be accompanied by an ejectment through force.103 Given that there has been a dearth 
of scholarship on licenses for decades, moreover, this is a state of flux that is unlikely to 
vanish anytime soon.104  
Even beyond the question of when a license is revocable versus irrevocable, 
however, widespread use of licenses can be problematic given that they are not 
                                                 
99 Id. at 329. 
100 Id. at 380. At its most basic level, irrevocability is an attempt to protect significant investments of time 
and money and thereby make it feasible for widespread investments based on licenses. See Michael 
A.Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through a Property Paradigm, 54 DUKE L.J. 1, 79 (2004) 
[hereinafter Cabining]. 
101 Compare State Dep't of Highways v. Woolley, 696 P.2d 828, 831 (1985) (suggesting that any 
expenditure may make a license irrevocable) and Camp v. Milam, 291 Ala. 12 (stating that the a license 
turns into an executed license when it has been “acted upon so as to greatly benefit the licensor”) with 
Eliopulos v. Kondo Farms, Inc., 643 P.2d 1085 (Id. 1992) (holding that an executed license is irrevocable 
only for as long as it takes to realize plaintiff’s expenditures, with defendant’s investment of $500 and labor 
to dig a trench being realized by six yeas of the trench draining water from his land) and Bieber v. Zellner, 
220 A.2d 17, 19 (Pa. 1966) (holding that improvements on a roadway did not themselves indicate reliance). 
102 Compare Brown v. Eoff, 530 P.2d 49, 51 (Ore. 1975) (stating that plaintiff’s attempt to negotiate a 
permanent arrangement defeated the argument that plaintiff had acted in reasonable reliance) with Belmon 
County Water Dist. v. State, 135 Cal. Rept. 163, 166 (Cal. App. 1976) (holding that expenditures in 
reliance on a revocable water permit made the permit irrevocable).  
103 Amusement Patron, supra note 95, at 812. 
104 Henry E. Smith & Thomas W. Merrill Casebook ch. V; see, e.g. Amusement Patron, supra note 95, at 
818, 822. 
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enforceable against third parties. While most property rights105 are “in rem” and therefore 
“good against all the world,” licenses, like the vast majority of contract rights, are “in 
personam” and only enforceable against the licensor.106 As such, while licenses are a 
fairly good tool for determining a governance strategy for a piece of property, they are 
not a good mechanism to control who has the ability to exclude others from using that 
property.107 
 
2. Licenses Within Virtual Worlds 
 As complex and bewildering as license doctrine can be in the abstract for the real 
world, however, the situation within virtual worlds is even more confusing and troubling. 
As noted previously, although most EULA’s’ terms appear on their face to be impossible 
to crack,108 the kinds of activities these EULA’s govern makes it very questionable 
                                                 
105 E.g. fee simples, easements, leases.  
106 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY, supra note 96, at § 521; see Thomas W. Merill & Henry E. Smith, 
The Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 773, 782 (2001) [hereinafter Property/Contract 
Interface]. 
107 See Property/Contract Interface, supra note 106, at 791. 
108 Admittedly, the fact that all of these EULA’s utilize boilerplate begs the question of whether users even 
attempt to read the text of the EULA’s before signing them. In their seminal article twenty years ago, Alan 
Schwartz and Louis L. Wilde argued that the critical question is not whether all users will read boilerplate, 
but whether any number of users will. According to Schwartz and Wilde, if even a small proportion of 
users actually read and “shopped” for good standard-form contracts, enough competitive pressure could be 
placed on organizations that efficient standard-form terms would be adopted throughout the market. Alan 
Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Imperfect Information in Markets for Contract Terms: The Examples of 
Warranties and Security Interests, 69 VA. L. REV. 1387 (1983). Of course, the counter to this theory is that 
a select few users reading boilerplate will not improve the quality and efficiency of all standard-contracts, 
but will only force the readers to switch to “a more expensive higher-quality provider” that the non-readers 
cannot even utilize. Jason Scott Johnston, The Return of Bargain: An Economic Theory of How Standard-
Form Contracts Enable Cooperative Negotiation Between Businesses and Consumers, 104 MICH. L. REV. 
857, 885 (2006). Moreover, given that the majority of consumers have proven unable to comprehend the 
terms of given boilerplate agreements, it questionable whether forcing users to read a contract, a 
proposition that may not even be possible from a technical perspective, would make any difference in terms 
of encouraging efficient choice of contract. See Ronald J. Mann, Contracting for Credit, 104 MICH. L. REV. 
899, 911 (2006). 
While it is far beyond the scope of this work to resolve this debate, some observations may be 
made about boilerplate in terms of EULA’s for virtual worlds in particular. Specifically, it likely does not 
matter that the vast majority of users do not read the EULA’s. Although it is probable, even likely based on 
other research, that only a small proportion of virtual world users read the terms of service, see id., the 
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whether courts will uphold them across the board.109 If nothing else, although the vast 
majority of EULA’s claim that users do not have the right to transfer, trade, or sell the 
virtual property they “possess” to other entities, users are engaging in such practices en 
masse.110 
While such acts would be troublesome even if unsanctioned, though, in some 
cases the game company acts as the middleman in such transfers,111 taking a cut from all 
sales while still retaining the right to terminate a user’s account “at any time.”112 Given 
that the right to transfer and the right to use are “at the heart of courts’ and laypersons’ 
                                                                                                                                                 
unique nature of the good that is being received upon agreement, access to a virtual world, somewhat 
mitigates the failure of most users to read the terms themselves. After all, the communicative nature of 
virtual worlds and the length of time that users spend in a virtual world makes it much easier to free ride off 
the fact that other users have read the requisite EULA, much like groups of users can work together to 
digest boilerplate by all reading a small piece. See Kevin E. Davis, The Role of Nonprofits in the 
Production of Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1075, 1094 (2006). For instance, if a EULA states that all 
users may not make any profit from trading goods within the virtual world, even if only one user out of 
10,000 reads the EULA, the level of interactivity among users makes it possible for that discovery to 
rapidly spread throughout the virtual world. While it is less easy for consumers to change virtual worlds 
after an agreement due to sunk costs, it is probable that the more negative the term, the more consumers 
will choose to leave the virtual world. As such, the fact that involvement in a virtual world is long-lasting 
and users can join together and free ride off the efforts of other users suggests that whether most users read 
a EULA is irrelevant—all that matters is whether a very, very small number do, and whether they can 
easily distribute their findings throughout the specific virtual world and the Metaverse generally. 
 Yet, to a degree, all discussions of whether it matters if boilerplate is read are irrelevant at present 
with regards to virtual worlds due to the very small number of virtual worlds. While it is relatively easy for 
consumers to shop around for better terms of insurance, airfare, or a loan, there are only a handful of extant 
virtual worlds and all of them have practically identical terms within their EULA’s (with the marked 
exception of Second Life giving users a modicum of intellectual property rights). See supra note 53. As a 
result, the fact that users are faced with the Hobson’s Choice at present of accepting the terms as given or 
not being involved in any virtual world means they have no meaningful choice at present. It is entirely 
possible that the number of virtual worlds with different terms will increase in the near future, however. 
109 See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text. 
110 See Cyberian, supra note 12. 
111 The primary example of this is Sony’s Station Exchange, http://stationexchange.station.sony.com/ (last 
visited Jul. 18, 2007), which sought to end sales of virtual property through Ebay by mandating that all 
sales of virtual property from its virtual worlds must go through its own service. The service has proven 
wildly popular, with over U.S. $180,000 worth of virtual property being transferred through the system in 
its first thirty days. See Daniel Terdiman, Sony Scores with Station Exchange, CNET NEWS.COM, Aug. 25, 
2005, http://news.com.com/Sony+scores+with+Station+Exchange/2100-1043_3-5842791.html. 
112 Sony Online Entertainment LLC Terms of Service, http://www.station.sony.com/en/termsofservice.vm 
(last visited Jul. 18, 2007). 
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understandings of property,” it appears clear that virtual property is being used very 
differently compared to the average uses of property governed by licenses.113  
 Admittedly, aside from Sony and Linden Lab,114 many owners of virtual worlds 
have not promulgated such mixed messages to the same degree and may claim that no 
amount of trading can create reasonable reliance when the EULA states that the user has 
no right to her virtual property. Although such a claim does not remedy the situation 
things even if it is completely accurate given the size and significance of Sony’s and 
Linden Lab’s virtual worlds, this claim may be quite inaccurate. Most critically, such 
agreements, whether agreed to through a click-wrap license or a browse-wrap license, are 
almost never read by users.115 Additionally, after clicking through during the initial 
installation and running of the client program, users are almost never forced to assent to 
the EULA again.116 Considering that “most of the time Layman negotiates his way 
through the complex web of property relationships that structures his social universe 
without even perceiving the need for expert guidance,” it is very feasible that courts will 
hold that the licenses are not universally revocable.117 
 In truth, the idea that millions of people are putting significant amounts of capital 
into virtual worlds may force courts to act simply for public policy purposes. While 
common law courts struggled early in the Twentieth Century to find reasons why a 
                                                 
113 Wendy J. Gordon An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of Consistency, Consent, and 
Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1354 (1989). 
114 See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text. 
115 See Nathaniel Good, et al. Commentary, User Choices and Regret: Understanding Users’ Decision 
Process about Consensually Acquired Spyware, 2 ISJLP 283, 284-85 (2006). 
116 See, e.g. SECOND LIFE; see also THERE.COM (requiring click-through assent of its ToS only when the 
ToS is updated). 
117 BRUCE ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 116 (1977). 
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theater patron with a ticket could not be ejected at any time at the owner’s discretion,118 
an equilibrium was eventually reached based on the idea that owners of places of 
amusement have a common law right to exclude who they wish.119 The situation of 
virtual worlds is much more troublesome, however. While a patron of a race track may 
lose the right to gamble further upon his ejectment, he retains the money he has cashed in 
and, at the very least, the possessions he entered the race track with. A theater patron only 
loses the value of his ticket, along with possibly the value of his lost time.120 In contrast, a 
user of a virtual world, if his license is revoked and he is “ejected” risks losing access to 
his entire account and all the assets attached to it, assets that could easily amount to 
thousands of dollars or more. In effect, users are paying for the privilege to use 
something that can be revoked at any time without any hope of refund or redress, a notion 
which strongly goes against our notions of justice and equity.121 From a purely practical 
standpoint, the idea that users of virtual worlds have only the barest amount of control 
over their property should raise concerns about whether the property is being used 
well122—if anything, the fact that a generic possession could be taken at any time should 
make it less likely that a person will use that possession as effectively as possible, since 
that person may naturally fear growing too reliant on the item in case it is eventually lost. 
As Richard Bartle puts it, “When you buy a virtual object, you’re gambling that the 
virtual world giving it meaning will not change in such a way that it reduces the amount 
                                                 
118 Compare Marrone v. Washington Jockey Club of the District of Columbia, 227 U.S. 633 (1913) with 
Hurst v. Picture Theaters, Limited 1915 1 K.B. 1. 
119 See Ziskis v. Kowalski, 726 F. Supp. 902 (D. Ct. 1989). An additional reason for this outcome may be 
the belief that the greatest danger was arbitrary ejectment and that seemed to be rare. See Amusement 
Patron, supra note 95, at 822. The core question seems to have been largely forgotten after that time. 
120 Along with perhaps any concessions he might have bought after entry. 
121 Id. at 810. 
122 See Fairfield, supra note 7, at 1050. 
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that people will pay for that object.” 123 The current state of virtual worlds with regard to 
virtual property is thus something of a recreation of the law of licenses before Hurst v. 
Picture Theatres, Limited,124 where a user has the privilege to use virtual property in his 
possession, but that use can be revoked at any time, resulting in a very weak form of 
“ownership.”125 
 
3. Additional Concerns 
 Given how young many virtual worlds are, it is also unclear how courts will 
respond to the current system once users have been involved in virtual worlds for several 
years or a decade. Most critically, after significant periods of time have passed, it is 
possible that courts could find that users have obtained property rights within virtual 
worlds through adverse possession. While it might be quite difficult to find a plaintiff 
who met all five of the requirements of adverse possession,126 it is far from 
inconceivable, with the primary obstacle likely being whether a piece of virtual property 
held by the user within a virtual world controlled by a company counts as either actual or 
exclusive use. If that could be found, however, it would be possible to see courts granting 
actual “title” to virtual property. Moreover, if exclusive use proves to be the primary 
barrier to plaintiffs, courts could simply claim that a user-plaintiff has gained an easement 
by prescription, which would still have the effect of a court finding that a user has a 
property right within a virtual world.127 The many individual state statutes on adverse 
                                                 
123 Bartle, in STATE OF PLAY, supra note 9, at 44. 
124 Supra note 118. 
125 Contra Michael A. Carrier and Greg Lastowka, Against Cyberproperty 22 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 
(forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 20, on file with author) [hereinafter Against Cyberproperty] (arguing 
that robust technological and legal regimes protect users interests online). 
126 HOVENKAMP & KURTZ, supra note 98, at 65. 
127 See Warsaw v. Chicago Metallic Ceilings, Inc, 676 P.2d 584, 587 (Cal. 1984). 
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possession would largely determine the degree to which these attempts succeed, but one 
decision holding that adverse possession was effected or an easement by implication 
created could itself do massive damage to the Metaverse.128  
 Admittedly, given that a user can access a virtual world legally only by 
permission of the game companies, it may be hard to imagine how anything akin to 
adverse possession could occur.  Yet, depending on how courts view “access” with 
regards to virtual worlds, such a scenario could come to pass.  The traditional view, 
namely, that a user is granted access upon purchasing a ticket, makes adverse possession 
practically impossible.  Yet, an alternative view could be taken that while the access was 
by permission, the game company was only a tollbooth operator, and the user has 
effectively become a squatter by making an avatar and claiming that bit of code has her 
own.   
In truth, this is a situation that defies real-world analogy.  Faced with the 
Hobson’s choice of bending adverse possession slightly or depriving a person of 
substantial assets, it is not difficult to imagine that a court would structure its decision in 
such a way as to suggest that the plaintiff when being let into the world saw themselves 
as purchasing the account in entirety from the game company, blurring whether they 
actually had permission. In other words, it is the distinction between having permission to 
enter the world and permission to control the character—while  a user knows she has 
permission to enter, whether she has permission to use the character is a different story.  
Given the difficulties of such parsing and the likely unfamiliarity of most judges and 
juries with virtual worlds for the near and moderate future, it is easy to see a court 
coming down on the side of the plaintiff at least once.  Given the current precarious state 
                                                 
128 See Cabining, supra note 100 at 19 
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of user-company legal relationships within virtual worlds, one such decision could have 
an apocalyptic effect on the Metaverse. 
 
B. Total Control as an Economic Inefficiency and Moral Concern 
Based on the terms dictated by the various EULA’s, the owners of the virtual 
worlds effectively have total control of their virtual worlds, a situation that also poses 
problems for the future of the Metaverse. Because the companies control the code and 
norms of the virtual worlds, at base, they make all property decisions.129 Even though 
users may have some control over individual transactions, the company, due to its control 
of the metrics, is the ultimate decision-maker. Virtual worlds are thus something of a 
recreation of the company towns of the late-nineteenth century—given that even in 
company towns the company stayed out of the homes of its workers, however, virtual 
worlds represent a purer conception of the company town than just about anything seen a 
hundred years ago.130 Currently, it is possible, even easy and simple, for one company to 
simply subtract a critical attribute from a piece of virtual property or move the location of 
a piece of virtual property from a highly desired area to a less-desired area, actions that 
may substantially change the value a user’s total virtual property assets, 131 possibly to the 
point that pieces of virtual property lose their entire value.132  
As such, although the Internet is conceived of as a place that is defined by 
openness and is an “experiment of self-governance,”133 virtual worlds stand as something 
of a counterpoint. Since users are asked to enter and “live” within a virtual world 
                                                 
129 See Jankowich, supra note 43, at 215. 
130 See Saunders, supra note 42, at 203-04. 
131 See Bartle, in STATE OF PLAY, supra note 9, at 44 (offering a differing perspective). 
132 See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
133 See Lawrence Lessig, Law Regulating Code Regulating Law, 35 LOYOLA UNIV. CH. L.J. 1, 13-14 (2003) 
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knowing that all their possessions are not ultimately in their control, a more accurate 
description than a company town in cyberspace might be digital feudalism.134 Although 
this may seem like hyperbole given that users have to willingly choose to accept the 
terms of a virtual world, the absence of perfect information in bargaining naturally tends 
to result in unfair contract terms.  According to Prof. Alan Schwartz, an uninformed 
promise will often receive terms that are undercompensatory in nature even where full 
negotiation is possible.135 While there is certainly value to the idea that the company does 
have the right to punish its users for infractions of the norms and rules of the word, it 
seems inefficient and incorrect that a user risks losing her entire stock of assets and 
virtual property for any infraction. If anything, such dangers serve as a counterweight to 
the continued growth of and investment in virtual worlds, even as those worlds are 
beginning to gain broad-based interest from society.136 In effect, the fact that possession 
of all virtual property is divided between at least two entities, the company, which has the 
title and exclusionary rights, and the user, who has possession and the ability to actually 
use the property, suggests that the current state of virtual worlds is something of a 
mutated anticommons,137 one where no one has full privileges, causing under-use of the 
                                                 
134 See Jankowich, supra note 43, at 218. Granted, this is something of a malapropism given that feudalism 
largely rested on in personam agreements. The term “digital feudalism” is designed rather to evoke the 
general popular view of feudalism as an institution that lets the few dominate the many. 
135 Alan Schwartz, The Myth that Promisees Prefer Supracompensatory Remedies: An Analysis of 
Contracting for Damage Measures, 100 YALE L.J. 369, 379 (1990). 
136 A trend marked especially by the entrance of corporations into virtual worlds in recent months. See, e.g., 
Patrick Cain, Companies are Finding Second Life, INVESTORS.COM, Feb. 21, 2007, 
http://www.investors.com/editorial/IBDArticles.asp?artsec=17&issue=20070221; Kate Benner, I Got my 
Job Though Second Life, FORTUNE, Jan. 23, 2007, 
http://money.cnn.com/2007/01/22/magazines/fortune/secondlife_recruit.fortune/index.htm?postversion=20
07012310. 
137 See Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons—Property in the Transition from Marx to 
Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998). 
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worlds’ resources.138 Specifically, two factors can be deemed largely responsible for this 
state of affairs.  First, there has been a general lack of foresight by game companies—in 
their attempts to minimize the risks to themselves and future profits,139 most companies 
have been reluctant to establish broader property rights, even though such rights could 
spur users to spend more money and time within virtual worlds.  Second, there are 
externality issues, particularly in terms of how a system of property rights would be 
managed—as it is likely that the brunt of any regulatory system’s costs would fall on the 
companies, keeping property rights minimal appears to be a cheaper alternative.140 
Although virtual worlds might have great potential for the creation of value through user-
created content and trading, at present, they do not appear optimally efficient. 
 Beyond specific concerns about the practical impact of such control, however, 
there are also concerns about the sheer morality of such a system given long-standing 
general philosophical views toward property rights.141 Specifically, the idea that users are 
asked to move online and build inventories, accumulate wealth, or even engage in the 
creation of new goods, all while still being willing to give up all ownership of those 
                                                 
138 Of course, the company could mandate efficient use of the resource, but that sort of rigidity would likely 
doom the virtual world. Similarly, direct use of the resource by the company would practically eliminate 
the usefulness or need for users, also damaging the world. 
139 See supra notes 72-81 and accompanying text. 
140 Of course, it is entirely possible that network effects could be a third factor in triggering this anti-
commons, possibly by encouraging users to spend time in multiple worlds as opposed to one, with the 
result that many users only skim the surface of each world.  If property rights existed for virtual worlds, 
however, it is very possible that users would choose to focus on one individual world to the exclusion of 
others in the hopes of fully utilizing the world’s resources in the pursuit of economic profit.  The lack of 
any hard data on these issues makes analysis of this topic mere speculation at present, however. 
141 Most relevant for this topic are the Lockean, Utilitarian, and Hegelian theories of property rights. See 
Laws, supra note 7 at 40 (discussing all three in depth); see also, Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 
986, 1003 (1984) (discussing Locke); Raising Questions about Property, in PROPERTY IN QUESTION, supra 
note 37, at 4 (Locke); Cabining, supra note 100, at 9-10 (utilitarian); Theodore J. Westbrook, Owned: 
Finding a Place for Virtual Property Rights, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 779, 791-801 (2006) (discussing all 
three). 
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things,142 does violence to the idea of property as being labor-dessert,143 the greatest good 
being given to the greatest number,144 and the concept of property ownership assisting the 
establishment and growth of personhood. Of these three conceptions, the final is perhaps 
the most troubling. Although a critique using the first and second conceptions of property 
can be partially deflected since the company, by virtue of having made and maintained 
the virtual world, has a right to own the property within and the greatest utilitarian 
outcome may well occur when all property is ultimately owned by one party, it is difficult 
to see an argument for why having the company own the property results in an enriching 
socializing experience for users, 145 especially considering how significant it is for 
someone to be able to say “this is mine.”146 While not having the ability to own their 
virtual property might limit the degree to which users form entirely new identities within 
the virtual world, this is not necessarily a good thing, especially given that one of the 
primary appeals of virtual worlds is the constant ability to create for oneself a new 
identity regardless of past and socialization. The total control of virtual property by game 
companies is effectively undercutting one of the greatest strengths of the virtual world 
archetype—even as some scholars warn of the game conceit147 being damaged by 
property rights, some level of property rights may be necessary to fulfill it.148 
                                                 
142 Along with, in most cases, the intellectual property rights associated with new creations. 
143 In a very real sense, the laborer is not allowed to keep that which he has worked with or even created. 
144 Since the EULA’s effectively vest the property right in one party, depriving millions of users of such 
rights. 
145 Laws, supra note 7, at 50-52 
146 See Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730 (1998) (arguing that 
exclusion is the sine qua non of property rights); Adam Mossoff, What Is Property? Putting the Pieces 
Back Together, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 371, 377-78 (2003) (discussing the long-standing notion that exclusion is 
the most important aspect of traditional property rights). 
147 Game conceit can be defined roughly as the idea that one is “playing” a game. In other words, “[w]hen 
people play games, they agree to abide temporarily by a set of rules which limits their behavior (i.e. 
restricts their freedom), in exchange for which they gain whatever benefits the game offers. Game theorists 
refer to the boundary that separates the game world from the non game world as the magic circle, from an 
early description of play spaces by John Huizinga. Virtual worlds are not games but they use the same 
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 As such, the current situation of virtual property within virtual worlds is 
problematic, with the governance system created by the EULA’s potentially untenable, 
economically inefficient, and morally suspect. Given these dangers, it is worth looking to 
property and contract law for solutions—as the next Part discusses, however, neither 
provides a wholly good model to apply to virtual worlds, necessitating that a new kind of 
property interest be established for virtual worlds. 
 
III. Flawed Solutions—Contract and Property Applied to Virtual 
Worlds 
  Although the EULA’s seem to be untenable as a system for governing virtual 
property, there remains the possibility that effective use and ownership of virtual property 
could be controlled through either contract or property law. Given the unique natures of 
virtual worlds, however, it appears that many of the most likely legal concepts for 
managing contract and property relationships would not be good fits for virtual worlds. 
 
A. Contract 
 Given both that EULA’s are contracts, and that contract law would be less invasive 
within virtual worlds than property law, one might think that contract law would be a 
good mechanism for governing virtual worlds. Yet, an analysis of how many of the key 
ideas of contract law, specifically, contracts of adhesion, unconscionability, individual 
                                                                                                                                                 
conceit: that some freedoms must be willingly given up for a time in order that new freedoms can be 
experienced during that time.” For a longer discussion, see infra pp. 58-60. 
148 See Bartle, in STATE OF PLAY, supra note 9. 
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contracting, and executed licenses, would be applied to virtual worlds reveals that 
contract law would not dramatically improve the use and ownership of virtual property 
compared to the status quo. 
 
1. Contracts of Adhesion 
 Contracts of adhesion, “contract[s] formed as a ‘product of gross inequality of 
bargaining power’ between parties,”149 might seem on first glance to be well-tailored to 
meet the problems of virtual property. The current instrument that states the terms of who 
owns virtual property and how it may be used and transferred is the EULA, and given 
that any user is not able to negotiate unique terms but is forced to accept all terms of the 
EULA or be denied access to the virtual world, the concept of contracts of adhesion 
would seem to provide an excellent way to enforce more equitable terms on the 
ownership of virtual property.  
Yet, beyond the obvious question of just what terms would be deemed a contract 
of adhesion and which would not with regards to virtual worlds, the doctrine is not nearly 
strong enough to provide effective protection for users. Simply put, while the EULA’s do 
seem to fit the nominal definition of a contract of adhesion, the doctrine generally has 
been held to require some showing of procedural unconscionability, such as fraud.150 
Indeed, a primary attribute of contracts of adhesion, one that is often missing in standard-
form contracts like EULA’s, is that the party with less bargaining power has to be forced 
                                                 
149 Klos v. Polskie Linie Lotnicze, 133 F.3d 164, 168 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting Aviall, Inc. v. Ryder Sys., 
Inc., 913 F. Supp. 826, 831 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)). An alternative definition is “standard form contracts 
presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.” Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in 
Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV 1174, 1174 (1983). 
150 7 Arthur Linton Corbin, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS 29.10 (Joseph M. Perillo ed. 2006); see Flores v. 
Transamerica Homefirst, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 376, 381 (2004). This is different than substantive 
unconscionability, of course. See infra pp. 32-34. 
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to make a decision without the opportunity to consider the consequences.151 Similarly, the 
presence of any meaningful choice152 also seems to defeat the possibility that a contract 
will be held to be a contract of adhesion.153 The fact that a potential user can take as long 
as she wishes before assenting to the terms of the EULA and can choose between many 
different EULA’s renders this aspect of contract law a dead-end for virtual worlds. After 
all, standard-form contracts in the analog world which might be construed as contracts of 
adhesion have been largely upheld by virtue of their usefulness for both consumers and 
businesses.154 Even the fact that the EULA’s could have deferred terms does not seem to 
make the EULA’s unenforceable on unconscionability grounds.155 
Barring a significant change in the way standard-form contracts are generally 
viewed then, it seems that the doctrine of contract of adhesion would provide no 
additional support for users’ property rights. 
 
2. Unconscionability  
 Another possibility would be to utilize the doctrine of unconscionability itself, but 
this would also prove somewhat problematic.156 Again, while this doctrine might seem 
                                                 
151 See Aral v. Earthlink, Inc, 134 Cal. Rptr. 3d 229, 238 (2005) (stating that “quintessential procedural 
unconsionability” existed where “the terms of the agreement were presented on a ‘take it or leave it’ basis . 
. . with no opportunity to opt out”). 
152 The fact that there are other valid options available besides assenting to the contract (what I meaningful 
choice for short) means that users are not being forced to agree but are consenting because they wish to. In 
other words, there is true consent on the part of users. 
153 See Flores, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 38; Robin v. Blue Cross Hosp. Serv., Inc., 637 S.W. 2d 695 (Mo. 1982). 
154 Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracts in the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 429, 437-38 (2002) (“Although standard-form contracts seem suspect and fail to satisfy contract 
law’s notions of bargained-for exchange, courts and theorists generally consider enforcement of such terms 
appropriate.”) 
155 Stepehn E. Friedmam, Improving the Rolling Contract, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 37 (2005) (stating that 
ProCD and Hill basically put a stamp of approval on deferred terms even with regard to claims of personal 
unconscionability). 
156 While procedural unconscionability is needed for a contract to be a contract of adhesion, 
unconscionability requires substantive unconscionability and, in some jurisdictions, procedural 
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quite useful since users are paying significant fees for the privilege to spend money in a 
virtual world but have no right to keep anything they purchase or possess within the 
world, suggesting that the terms of the EULA are substantively unconscionable, this 
doctrine also fails to have much potential.157 If anything, it seems like unconscionability 
is less feasible as a workable doctrine for controlling user-company relations than 
contracts of adhesion, since some jurisdictions require both procedural and substantive 
unconscionability for a contract to be held unenforceable on unconscionability grounds. 
 Assuming that a jurisdiction did not require procedural unconscionability, 
however, showing that substantive unconscionability exists would be quite difficult. 
Because virtual worlds are, in many cases, largely designed for entertainment, it is highly 
likely that courts would apply the logic of Justice Scalia in PGA158—specifically, that the 
rules in such a game are arbitrary and cannot be measured or disputed by judges.159 Also, 
it would be quite difficult to argue that consideration was not being received by users, 
given that users are receiving something, the right to exist/play within a virtual world, 
even if they are not receiving some measure of property rights. While that may not seem 
significant considering the amount of virtual property and monetary assets at stake, that is 
likely more than enough for most courts. Not only is it unclear exactly what constitutes 
                                                                                                                                                 
unconscionability. See Bower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S. 2d 569, 574-75 (App. Div. 1998) (holding 
that procedural unconscionability is not always required for a finding of unconscionability); Maxwell v. 
Fidelity Fin. Servs., Inc., 907 P.2d 51, 58-59 (Ariz. 1995) (holding that despite the fact that “perhaps a 
majority” of courts have held that there must be at least some quantum of both procedural and substantive 
unconscionability, a claim of unconscionability can be established under Arizona’s version of the U.C.C. 
with a showing of “substantive unconscionability alone”). 
157 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981). 
158 PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661 (2001). 
159 See Virtual Crime, in STATE OF PLAY, supra note 9, at 129. 
Slaughter 39
substantive unconscionability in a general sense,160 but also “courts have difficulty 
distinguishing between terms that create a reasonable arrangement of risks and terms that 
constitute exploitation of consumers.”161 Combined with the fact that it is unclear 
whether U.C.C. Article 2 even applies to downloadable software,162 the general picture 
that emerges is that unconscionability might also be a fairly mediocre solution to the 
question of how to apportion virtual property rights.  
 
3. Individual Contracting 
 Although it seems that the fact that the standard-form contract EULA’s are a 
problem, going in the other direction toward individual contracting does not seem to be a 
particularly practical or optimal solution either. Admittedly, individual contracting 
between specific users and the company, forgetting the massive cost issues to the 
company,163 would guarantee arrangements that best fit the needs of just about all 
users.164 Yet, individual contracting would likely not be a valid option for virtual worlds 
even if they only had a sliver of the millions of users they do, given that the unique 
property rights that each user could possess over their virtual property would make 
trading and even governing pieces of virtual property practically impossible due to 
astronomical information costs. Since “information costs are [the] key to understanding a 
system of property rights,” the prospect of multiplying current information costs a 
                                                 
160 See Arthur Allan Leff, Unconscionability and the Code—The Emperor’s New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. 
REV. 485, 487-88 (1967) (analyzing the Uniform Commercial Code’s section 2-302 and the absence of a 
precise definition for unconscionability) 
161 Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 154, at 441. 
162 See Specht v. Netscape, 360 F. 3d 17, 29 fn. 13 (2d Cir. 2002). 
163 See Fairfield, supra note 7, at 1092. Of course, if this were an opt-in regime, it is possible many users 
would not care one way or another. 
164 See Property/Contract Interface, supra note 106, at 777 (stating that contracting parties are generally in 
the best position to evaluate costs and benefits). 
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million-fold underlines that this is also a mediocre option—better to stay with a poor 
default than adopt an unworkable system.165 
 Admittedly, one possible solution to this would be to establish some manner of 
database, a wiki of virtual property that could be easily accessed by users.  While the 
concept of having access to clear-cut types of virtual property is appealing,166 a wiki may 
be difficult to utilize due to practical issues related to bandwidth costs and translation 
costs (since the wiki would have to be accessible to people around the world), both of 
which would likely fall on the companies, who will resist the additional costs for what 
they may see as negligible benefit.  Additionally, it is possible that the system may not be 
accessed frequently by users, since many users, who may not have an especially strong 
economic focus on their involvement within virtual worlds for the near future, may think 
that the effort is not worth their time.167  As a result, many users may fall into the trap of 
only using a handful of property types anyway.   
 
4. Executed License 
As previously noted,168 the doctrine of licenses is quite muddled, but the idea of 
utilizing the executed license to clarify and define virtual property rights is somewhat 
                                                 
165 Id. at 776, 852. 
166 And one that I also seek to use in the virtual easement.  See discussion infra Part IV.E. 
167 After all, the average user at present has an incentive to standardize wherever she believes that the effort 
to create unique property interests is outweighed by the cost in time and energy in researching possible 
interests.  For the average user of virtual worlds, there seems to be a greater incentive to focus on exploring 
the worlds rather than accumulating items, a trend that exists largely because the number of new users 
keeps multiplying.  Once the number of virtual world users stabilizes and relatively new users are a fairly 
small percentage of the general number of virtual world users, the incentive to focus on exploration will 
likely decrease.  Given the growth of virtual worlds over the last few years, it may be years before such 
stabilization occurs, and the longer the status quo in terms of property rights persists, the harder it will 
become to adopt radical changes to how virtual property is possessed. 
168 See supra pp. 19-21. 
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fruitful given that it lies on the boundary of contract and property.169 The primary 
problem, however, remains: the amount of resources that have to be spent so that the 
license will be held irrevocable to allow for the licensee to recoup his investment.170 
Although the passage of statutes stating what the baseline investment in time and/or 
money must be for this to take place would be one option,171 it is unclear just what kind 
of impact such a system would have on virtual worlds. Some users who have been in the 
world a very long time could use this principle to stay well after the company wishes 
them to leave, to the extent that the companies control of the virtual world could be 
damaged. Similarly, even if clear benchmarks could be established for when licenses 
have become executed, it would be practically impossible to devise a clear-cut and 
accessible system of benchmarks for how long a user needs to recover their investment. 
If, for instance, a user invests U.S. $4000 buying a special sword and has an executed 
license in that property when the company asks them to leave, the amount of time the 
user will be able to continue being involved in the world may depend entirely on the 
demand within the market for that item. While the license might last hours for some, it 
might last weeks or even months for others, making it exceedingly difficult for game 
companies to enforce ejections. Finally, there is also the issue of just what the user has an 
executed interest in—their general holdings172 or individual pieces of virtual property.173 
                                                 
169 The executed license has been said to be effectively the same thing as an easement. Analysis, surpa note 
60, at 820. 
170 See Cooke v. Ramponi, 239 P.2d 638, 641 (Cal. 1952). 
171 It would likely have to be a federal statute given jurisdictional issues, however. 
172 Meaning that a user who has invested significant resources in her avatar could instantly have an 
executed license in everything they accrue from the time the license for the avatar becomes executed. 
173 Meaning that it would be difficult to know just which pieces of virtual property counted as executed 
licenses and which did not. Although this problem could partially be solved by logging transactions, it is 
unlikely that users would have access to this information. 
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While the irrevocable license seems less critically flawed than the other contract options, 
it too is an incomplete solution. 
 
B. Property 
 Although property law would allow for more clear-cut standards and management 
of virtual property than either the status quo or contract law, it would also be something 
of a poor fit for virtual worlds. In truth, all of the most likely candidates from property 
law for managing virtual property, absolute property rights, a property rule, and leases, 
solve some of the problems that virtual worlds face but not all such problems. 
 
1. Absolute Property Right 
 Perhaps the simplest option for giving legal definition to virtual property would 
just be to give users the same rights when they buy virtual property that they would have 
if they bought real or personal property in the analog world. Although there are 
significant key differences between the nature of virtual property and property in the 
analog world174 and the system would be very rigid,175 this would have the advantages of 
clarity and standardization, along with conforming to general public norms—if one pays 
for something, one expects, on some intrinsic level, to have some right to it. Yet, given 
that virtual worlds are still controlled and owned, as a whole, by the companies, this 
                                                 
174 Although Joshua Fairfield believes that, like real-world property, virtual property has “rivalrousness, 
persistence, and interconnectivity,” supra note 7, at 1053, the fact that the code of virtual property can be 
deleted at any time without difficulty by administrators regardless of who possesses it underlines some of 
the innate differences between virtual property and real property. 
175 See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The 
Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 Yale L.J 1, 3 (2000) [hereinafter Numerus Clausus]. 
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solution seems to cut too far in favor of users, as establishing property rights within the 
world might destroy the ability of companies to maintain and regulate their worlds.176 
 First, a system of full property rights would mean that virtual property, once 
purchased, could be found to be completely out of the control of companies.177 But even 
if this problem could somehow be solved, possibly by stating that all users only have an 
easement in their virtual property, 178 others would remain. Most critically, altering the 
mechanics of the world in such a way as to change the attributes or natures of virtual 
property could become impossible. For example, suppose a user purchases a suit of 
armor, and the company later decides it is too powerful.  In an attempt to prevent the suit 
from giving players who possess it an unfair advantage,179 the company decreases the 
armor’s ability to defend by fifty percent, thereby decreasing its value by a significant 
amount, it is possible that a user could successfully sue the company for damages.180 This 
danger is not limited to just changes in the economic value of virtual property either—if a 
company were to change a user’s virtual property island so that its position within the 
world changed from one continent to another, it is possible that the user could attempt to 
sue then too, alleging something like a diminishment of enjoyment and demanding that 
the island be returned to its prior place. Giving players full ownership of property could 
also make cyber-trespass181 possible in the literal sense—indeed, while some virtual 
                                                 
176 But see Patrica A. Bellia, Defending Cyberproperty, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 2164 (2004) (arguing for the 
establishment of a property rule regime for cyberproperty, though she primarily focuses on cyber-trespass 
related issues). 
177 Since exclusion is the core aspect of traditional property rights. See Merrill, supra note 146. 
178 Though this could be troublesome to implement as well, in part due to the need for a deed of 
conveyance and the open question of whether the easement would be in gross or appurtenant. See HERBET 
HOVENKAMP & SHELDON F. KURTZ, supra note 98, at 321. 
179 One example of the company wishing to keep the virtual world interesting and roughly balanced, per its 
incentives. See supra notes 72-81 and accompanying text. 
180 See Bartle, in STATE OF PLAY, supra note 9, at 44. 
181 See Intel v. Hamdi, 71 P.3d 296 (Cal. 2003).  
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worlds already make it possible for users to exclude other users from their virtual land 
through code features,182 users could use their property rights to sue others in tort for 
trespassing. Considering how virtual worlds thrive in part because of their fluidity and the 
absence of clear boundaries, the risk of being legally liable for stepping the wrong place 
would dramatically change the tenor of virtual worlds, depriving them of the 
adventure/exploration dynamic that most possess. 
 
2. Property Rule 
 Additionally, the inherent nature of virtual worlds as realms completely governed 
by one entity does not fit with the application of a property rule.183 Not only is all 
property in a virtual world effectively fungible in terms of economic value—there is no 
difference between this virtual hoodie and that virtual hoodie of the same style and 
color—but also virtual world companies need to be able to force changes in the world if 
they are going to continue to have the ability to mold their worlds and maintain game 
conceit, possibly necessitating server resets that destroy players’ current virtual property, 
though the company can then give all users inventories identical in function and value to 
the inventories they had beforehand.184 Under a property rule system, users could sue in 
that situation and, since the users precise virtual property would be destroyed in this 
situation, win.185 The prospective of such a risk could easily encourage inefficient 
investment in protections against server crashes and make companies afraid to reset 
                                                 
182 See Locations for Support Information, http://secondlife.com/knowledgebase/article.php?id=151 (last 
visited Jul. 18, 2007). 
183 See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One 
View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). 
184 See Bartle, in STATE OF PLAY, supra note 9. 
185 While it might appear that users would have no incentive to do so, users tired of the world but unable to 
sell their possessions could engage in suit to gain an easy pay-out from companies. 
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servers in general.  As such, if a company wishes to change one part of its world from 
random buildings to structures of the same family of architecture, it needs to know that it 
will succeed from the beginning and not be forced to enter negotiations with the end 
result in doubt. While this might appear onerous to users, the fact the fungibility of code 
means that while they perceive that they are buying a house, a ship, or a pair of shoes, 
they are really just buying the utility of those items. As such, a system based on the value 
of virtual property, a la a liability rule,186 would be a more efficient system of 
governance.  
 Admittedly, this position does require a rather significant assumption—namely, 
that users will not mind if all the virtual property they possess can be replaced with the 
identical items.  Although this is logical given the way virtual property works, it is quite 
common for users to become attached in non-economic ways to property in the analog 
world.  If a child loses a cherished store-bought doll, a parent will often be unable to 
remedy the child’s feeling of loss by replacing it with an identical doll.  After all, the 
child has not only become attached to the kind of doll, but also that particular doll due to 
the experiences that the child shared with it.  Of course, adults seem to lack similar 
feelings for most of their personal possessions, and it is impossible for virtual property to 
experience the same “wear and tear” that may engender increased attachment to analog 
property, suggesting that it is fair to assume that users will be able to recognize that one 
virtual Opal Sword is the same as any other.187   
 
                                                 
186 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 183. 
187 Fantasy elements connected to some virtual worlds may encourage illogical emotional connections to 
virtual property, however, since users may see their specific equipment as the reason for their success (i.e. 
they believe they are a unique hero within a virtual world with unique items).  Research on how users relate 
to their virtual property is warranted before a final position can be taken on this subject. 
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3. Lease 
 Given that users are effectively paying dues for the privilege to interact within the 
virtual world,188 the lease may seem an attractive option for controlling property relations 
between users and companies—yet, this solution also fails to fit the Metaverse 
particularly well. First, the question of just what the user has a lease on, the account, each 
individual avatar, or each individual piece of virtual property, is a troubling one, 
especially since virtual property is traded so easily and often between users. Yet, if a user 
has a lease on each individual piece of property, it may become difficult for users to keep 
track of the status of the potentially hundreds or thousands of leases they have. One 
possible solution could be a system of recordation or recording, though this might be very 
expensive for a company to maintain. Conversely, having the lease be on the actual 
avatar’s possessions would mean that the leases were being broken apart whenever a 
trade took place. Second, while the lease does offer a way for companies to roughly have 
the ability to eject users promptly but still give users an opportunity to recoup their 
investment by utilizing periodic tenancies of relatively short duration,189 if the time 
period was long enough, it could lead to users engaging in extremely negative behavior 
out of spite if they feel they have nothing to lose from it.190 Most importantly, though, 
this form of property seems ill-suited just because it is not quite as fluid as virtual 
property—while leases can be assigned, this would only really work if the lease were on 
each individual piece of virtual property, as otherwise users would be transferring 
                                                 
188 See Henry E. Smith & Thomas W. Merrill Casebook VI-3 (“One can think of a lease as an arrangement 
in which the owner of the property lends possession to another, in return for periodic payments of money 
called rent.”). 
189 Possibly as short as a month or even a week at a time. See HERBET HOVENKAMP & SHELDON F. KURTZ, 
supra note 98, at 89-90. 
190 In truth, allowing users who engage in especially egregious acts, like hate speech or physical threats, to 
remain in the system for even a few hours after their offending acts could be anathema to most companies 
and deleterious to the Metaverse as a whole. 
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portions of the lease to other users, transforming it mid-lease. Combined with the various 
warranties that accompany leases, such as the covenant of quiet enjoyment, and the fact 
that leases seem to add needless formalism to the situation, the lease also seems to be a 
less than optimal solution. Notably, though, it appears that one of the most critical 
attributes of the lease, divided control between user and company, is especially useful. 
 On further analysis, then, it seems neither contract nor property provide, by 
themselves, optimal solutions to the question of what kind of property rights should be 
established for virtual property within virtual worlds. Yet, it does appear that many of the 
different subsets of contract and property, such as the license and the lease, have some 
beneficial characteristics. As such, the next Part discusses how many of the superior 
attributes of contract and property can be combined to create a property interest for 
virtual property that will allow for maximum efficiency for both users and companies. 
 
IV. The Virtual Easement 
 Although society should be hesitant about completely changing legal rules and 
regulations when facing new technological innovations,191 adaptation to this new form of 
communications and commerce seems to necessitate that a new approach be designed to 
govern ownership of virtual property, one that balances the interests of users, owners of 
virtual worlds, and the society in general.192 As indicated by the previous Part, the best 
fits within both property and contract to virtual worlds are those which possess some 
                                                 
191 See Daniel v. Dow Jones & Co., Inc., 520 N.Y.S.2d 334, 337-38 (Civ. Ct. 1987). But see David R. 
Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 Stan. L. Rev 1367, 1367 
(1996) (arguing that cyberspace is itself sufficiently different to warrant a rejection of this position). 
192 See Agin & Kumis, supra note 61, at 333.  
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measure of traits of the other area of law. As such, the new property interest, which may 
be called the virtual easement,193 follows in this pattern by adopting different attributes of 
contract and property law. Specifically, the virtual easement can be transferred from one 
user to another, will last as long as the user continues to make investments of time and/or 
money in their account and the world remains functioning, will be governed by a liability 
rule instead of a property rule, will have in rem enforcement capabilities, but will also be 
flexible so that different virtual worlds may choose from a limited, finite menu of 
interrations. Each of these attributes will be addressed in turn. 
 
A. Transferability 
 Since the ability to transfer an asset is arguably one of the key powers needed for 
one to say that she owns that asset,194 the virtual easement must allow for some degree of 
transferability if users are to feel anything like owners of their virtual property.195 To this 
extent, the virtual easement can be considered almost entirely transferable between 
individual persons, barring some potential minor limitations. Specifically, it may be wise 
to not allow minors or dependents to make binding transfers.196 This, of course, assumes 
                                                 
193 The property that the easement may be thought of as attached to is the user’s account within the virtual 
world.  As such, the virtual easement can be roughly analogized to an easement in gross. 
194 See Gordon, supra note 113, at 1354. I grant, of course, that many pieces of property cannot be 
transferred, such as some types of remainders subject to condition precedent (for example, O grants 
Blackacre to A until he attempts to transfer or sell it) or, more importantly, human property interests (i.e. at 
present, A can not transfer his freedom to B and make himself B’s slave). Still, much tangible and 
intangible property can be transferred and I take the position that transferability over entirely economic 
goods that are not connected to personal autonomy are ideally transferable. 
195 See id. (stating that the right to exclude, the right to transfer, and the right to use “are at the heart of 
courts’ and laypersons’ understandings of property”); Jessica Litman, Cyberspace and Privacy: A New 
Legal Paradigm? Information Privacy/Information Propery, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1296 (2000). 
196 The primary reason for this being that children and the mentally handicapped have impaired ability to 
consent to contracts. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 12 (1981); Loretta M. Kopelman, 
What Conditions Justify Risky Nontherapeutic or "No Benefit" Pediatric Studies: A Sliding Scale Analysis, 
32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 749, 749, (2004).  
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that individuals who fit those descriptions are involved in virtual worlds, but there is 
ample evidence of minors in particular comprising a significant proportion of virtual 
worlds, as well as having entirely youth-centered virtual worlds (see, e.g. Teen Second 
Life). Considering that the virtual easement applies only to situations where there has 
been some investment of time and value to a virtual world, however, presumably most 
minor and dependent virtual world users will not be at risk for engaging in trades without 
the permission of a parent or guardian. For those trades of virtual property which are not 
consented to, however, the best position may be to hold that they are binding subject to 
the law of agency. This is ultimately a policy decision that would be best reconsidered 
after additional study, however. 
While one primary reason for allowing transferability attribute is sheer 
practicality,197 another is the evocation of moral values of personhood and autonomy 
through the transfer process. Transferability may be taken to include sale, gifting, or even 
given to a third-party by descent or a will—just as a grandfather could make a bequest of 
$100,000 to his grandson, he could make a bequest of his user account within a virtual 
world as well.198  
There is one very important caveat to this transfer, however—the only thing that 
the receiving party has a right to is the value of the transferred item. While a game 
company could allow for a transfer of a virtual property scarf between user A and user B, 
the company may choose to intercede in the transfer. While it will be outside the 
company’s power to stop a sale, it may ‘buy’ the item from user A for market value, in 
                                                 
197 Because distribution of information is so easy and systems for trading virtual property already largely in 
place, if underground. See Radin, supra note 30. 
198 In effect, the virtual easement would be as descendible as an easement in gross. See HERBET 
HOVENKAMP & SHELDON F. KURTZ, supra note 98, at 320. 
Slaughter 50
effect negating the sale. While this might appear highly controversial, it can serve as a 
critical market regulation device for game companies, such as preventing transfers of 
especially potent items to players who have yet to sufficiently earn them.199 The situation 
may be analogized to restrictions on the sale of body parts200 or personal liberty more 
generally,201 with the additional notation that the restrictions placed by game companies 
on transfers need not be eternal. While restrictions on the sale of human parts are often 
couched in moral terms, a game company may decide to intercede in the sale for entirely 
arbitrary reasons: it wishes to encourage exploration of an area where the virtual property 
may be procured, it wishes to keep the item a mark of honor, or it wishes that a given 
item only be possessed by users named George.  
Naturally, a retort to this system is that, rather than intercede in the sale, the game 
company should simply not allow it at all, but this would damage the structure of the 
virtual easement—if the property interest is predicated on economic value, it must be 
possible to receive value for that item or the item becomes worthless. This danger is 
especially pronounced for gifts and bequests—a bar on transfers unilaterally would have 
the effect of the company taking possession of (potentially) valuable items at no cost to 
itself. While this does not mean that the company must buy an item that has no natural 
                                                 
199 See Bartle, in STATE OF PLAY, supra note 9, at 41; Law and Liberty, in STATE OF PLAY, supra note 9, at 
94. 
200 See Newman v. Sathyavaglswaran, 287 F.3d 786 (9th Cir. 2002). 
201 See Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911). By personal liberty, I mean that a person may not willingly 
give up his freedom (i.e. choose to be a slave). In other words, just as it is taken as fact that persons may 
not give up their liberty, since that violates societal norms, so may game companies take it as fact that a 
user may not give up their current status in the world by using money as a substitute for effort and 
commitment. Although the concept of slavery is far more troubling on a moral level than the idea that a 
novice gamer may be as powerful as a seasoned veteran, both ideas represent profound violations of 
societal norms, violations so great that they can throw the stability of the given society into question. 
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buyer in the market,202 it may not decide by fiat that a user’s virtual property has become 
economically valueless. Such a scenario would be ripe for abuse. 
 
B. Longevity 
 As previously noted,203 the length of an executed license is highly variable 
depending on the amount of the licensee’s expenditures. The virtual easement adopts an 
altered form of that position, but one that is far more predictable—namely, the length of 
the virtual easement is tied to both the continued existence of the virtual world and 
expenditure of time and/or money on the account. While some virtual worlds have proven 
quite persistent,204 it is unexpected that they will last forever, especially those run by 
companies for a primarily commercial purpose. Moreover, the virtual easement is tied to 
the individual virtual world.205 As a result, there is a question as to what happens to the 
property interests when/if the virtual world ceases functioning. Although it can be 
assumed that users will have legal notice of a final, permanent shutdown of a virtual 
world’s servers, meaning that users will have a chance to attempt to make returns on their 
investments, it is expected that such an announcement will cause all in-world goods to  
greatly diminish in value or even become valueless. Yet, it would be incorrect to suggest 
that users can make trades or seek to sell virtual property within their accounts once the 
                                                 
202 E.g. has a market value of U.S. $0. Procedural safeguards may be considered for situations where an 
item is given by bequest but has no natural buyers at the time the transfer actually takes place, such as the 
recipient having the right to take a calculated payment from the company or the privilege to wait x months 
to see if the market changes. 
203 See supra notes 70-72. 
204 One particular virtual world, Ultima Online, has remained active for just under ten years. Ultima Online, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ultima_Online (last visited Jul. 18, 2007). 
205 Significantly, this does not mean a player has an interest only in virtual property on one server. For 
virtual worlds that allow a user to choose which server to enter upon log-on, it may be assumed that his 
virtual property is not in any way lost or damaged in the process. Of course, where switching servers ad hoc 
is forbidden by the code or norms of the virtual world, then the user may have an interest only in the virtual 
property on the server that their assets (avatars, items, money, etc) inhabit. 
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world has stopped functioning: at the time of final shutdown, all assets within the virtual 
world effectively revert to the owner of the virtual world.206 Although this may be a 
disincentive to investing in a virtual world, to establish a system that forces game 
companies to buy-out all its user’s accounts if it wishes to shut down the world would be 
potentially economically inefficient even under a liability rule if the virtual world was 
only somewhat unprofitable.207 Indeed, it is conceivable that a company might regard it 
as less costly to keep the virtual world running, even if it is a net loser, if the cost of a 
universal purchase of all user accounts was very high.208 
 In terms of expenditures, the baseline for users to continue to have the virtual 
easement must be continued payment of any and all dues associated with the 
account209—a failure to pay for a set period of time210 would be tantamount to breach of 
the terms of the virtual easement and would mean that the game company could, 
potentially, elect to take possession of the account’s virtual property. Of course, there are 
some virtual worlds where a person may have an account without any fees at all,211 so 
this rubric would not always prove useful. An alternative measure of expenditure, 
however, could be either a time spent in-world requirement212 or simply a requirement 
that the user log-on for any length of time every so often (e.g. once a day, week, month, 
year, etc.). The primary reason for this requirement, which gives the companies 
                                                 
206 Thereby mimicking the trajectory of a fee simple determinable interest. 
207 For a discussion of why users cannot contract to avoid this scenario, please see infra pages 56-58. 
208 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Protecting Property Rights with Legal Remedies: A Common Sense Reply 
to Professor Ayres, 32 VAL. U. L. REV. 833, 837-38 (1998). 
209 These fees can be considered something resembling consideration in a contract sense. 
210 One that may vary by virtual world. 
211 See, e.g., THERE.COM; SECOND LIFE. 
212 Such as requiring that a user spend 5 hours a month logged-on with their account to constitute a 
sufficient expenditure. Given that the average user spends 20-30 hours a week logged on, this is far from an 
onerous requirement, but it could be modulated up or down depending on the nature of the world. See 
CODE, supra note 36. 
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something resembling adverse possession rights over user accounts, is to reduce 
efficiency within virtual world economies by making it impossible for users to acquire 
property and later cease interacting with the virtual world, rendering their acquired 
property inaccessible to other users and the company itself. While one might argue that 
the status of all virtual property as code means that the company could always simply put 
a new version into the world, the fact that the user could potentially stay uninvolved for 
years and then return adds needless complexity to the situation and makes it extremely 
difficult for companies to manage their virtual world economies with any degree of 
certainty.  
 
C. Liability Rule 
 Perhaps the most important attribute of the virtual easement is that it is based not 
on a property rule213 system but a liability rule one with each user having the entitlement, 
and the virtual world’s owner having the right to buy all of the user’s virtual property at 
market price at any time—in other words, a Rule 2 system in the Calabresi/Melamed 
rubric.214 If the company elects to use this option, the virtual easement will be deemed 
terminated and the user may be ejected from the virtual world, presumably forever if the 
                                                 
213 Although restitution damages can be given in response to an injury to property, I prefer to suggest that 
the liability rule, which will presumably focus on restitution damages, sounds more in contract law than in 
property.  I take this position primarily because contract law is inherently more closely linked to the kind of 
restitution damages that would be at play for the virtual easement.  While restitution of property might well 
necessitate the restoration of the actual property in question where money is by itself an insufficient remedy 
(for example, if A converts B’s bicycle, a court working from a property perspective may order the that 
specific bicycle be returned, while a court working from a contract perspective would likely just demand 
that the monetary value of the bicycle be returned). In terms of the virtual easement, courts should place 
maximum focus not on the property in question, whether it is available for return or not, but merely the 
monetary value of item, thus suggesting a closer connection to contract law.  Admittedly, this distinction is 
minute and not particularly salient in terms of how the virtual easement would work in practice. 
214 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 183. Of course, where there is no market price, some other 
manner of valuation would be necessitated. See Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of The Cathedral: The 
Dominance of Property Rules, 106 YALE L.J. 2091, 2114-15 (1997) [hereinafter Clear View] (stressing that 
liability rules must operated at an efficient price to be effective). 
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company wishes. At base, the procedure for how this transfer would work would 
resemble a form of eminent domain, where the company gives a user notice that their 
property is being taken and that fair compensation will be granted.215 Admittedly, the 
user might be able to gain reentry of some kind if virtual worlds were determined to be 
common carriers, but given that the FCC does not even believe the internet itself is 
subject to common carrier non-discrimination regulation, this seems highly unlikely. 216 
At the end of the day, the need for companies to have the ability to exclude some users 
renders makes them more like club goods than public goods.217  
While it might appear strange to apply this type of liability rule/entitlement 
system to virtual worlds given that the party that has a near-monopoly is the game 
company and not the user population,218 it must be remembered that, counter-intuitively, 
the game company’s near-monopoly status is not inherently offensive. Instead, the game 
company’s Leviathan-esque position is something that is crucial to management of the 
virtual world in some opinions and should be maintained as much as possible.219 Thus, if 
the virtual easement is meant to make it possible for players to have some degree of legal 
                                                 
215 Although a right of first refusal system might be preferable, only a system styled on eminent domain 
will guarantee that companies have the ability to kick users out of their worlds when the company desires 
it.  Admittedly, a hybrid system could be established that gives users the chance to look for an in-world 
buyer, yet this would increase the amount of time of the process.  Further, if the company is paying fair-
market value anyway, there would be little incentive for users facing expulsion to search out potential 
buyers. 
216 See In re Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, 13 F.C.C.R. 11501 (1998).   
217 For a discussion of the differences between club goods and public goods, see Christopher S. Yoo, 
Copyright and Public Good Economics: A Misunderstood Relation, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 635, 678 (2007). 
218 See Clear View, supra note 214, at 2093 (“A liability rule is typically adopted to counter the monopoly 
position of the holder of the asset. The holder of cash has no monopoly position at all, so it is very hard to 
believe that by allowing the present holder of some specific asset to designate the person who must take it 
off his hands, we advance any conceivable measure of social welfare.”). 
219 See Bartle, in STATE OF PLAY, supra note 9; see also James Grimmelmann, Virtual Power Politics, in 
STATE OF PLAY, supra note 9, at 146, 146-47 (2006) (noting that without careful control, virtual worlds can 
change dramatically in potentially dangerous ways practically overnight). 
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ownership of their virtual property, a safety valve is needed to prevent users from 
becoming deleterious influences to the virtual world220—hence, the liability rule. 
 Yet, it must be noted that even a liability rule can be abused. It would be 
potentially inefficient and morally troublesome if a user could log-off in the middle of a 
series of trades and, upon attempting to log-on a few hours later, be informed that his 
account’s assets have been purchased by the company and his account has been 
terminated. As such, some degree of advance notice must be needed prior to termination 
to allow a user the ability to settle their affairs within the virtual world, though this period 
of time could be extremely short depending on the world.221 Although this might lead to 
extremely negative behavior by users during the period where their account is awaiting 
termination, this could be partially mitigated by increased administrative monitoring or 
limits on the ability of a user’s in-world abilities that are not germane to economic 
purposes.222 Additionally, this liability rule right would be available only to the virtual 
world’s owner, making it an in personam right.223 While it might seem strange to apply 
the liability rule to only one party, given that users’ property interests are derived from 
the virtual world, and that giving users the ability to effectively buy-out other users could 
be very dangerous,224 this strategy seems to be necessary for the system to work. 
 
                                                 
220 See supra notes 72-81 and accompanying text. 
221 Indeed, for a virtual world with an especially fluid economy, it could be as short as a handful of hours, 
though a good minimum would be twenty-four hours given that a user might not log-on for a significant 
portion of a day at a time. Other lesser procedural safeguards would also likely be warranted. See Clear 
View, supra note 214, at 2120. 
222 Given that platform owners have the natural ability to view all transactions and events within the world, 
see Law and Liberty, in STATE OF PLAY, supra note 9, at 88, it would be an easy technical solution to 
simply “flag” pre-termination accounts for greater monitoring. 
223 See Property/Contract Interface, supra note 106. 
224 Dramatically increasing the danger of a user gaining monopoly level power in markets for some virtual 
world goods.  
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D. In Rem 
  Although the liability rule would effectively be in personam in nature, the rest of 
the virtual easement would have the form of an in rem entitlement, capable of being 
enforced against third-parties both inside and outside the world. This would be a massive 
change compared to the status quo even compared to other attributes of the virtual 
easement, since it would make actual litigation possible between users.225 Indeed, even 
just making the current EULA’s enforceable against third parties would make them 
strongly resemble full property rights.226 This innovation may seem unnecessary 
considering that a majority of the dangers this essay has focused on relate not to 
disagreements between users but conflicts between users and companies. Nevertheless, 
there are significant possibilities for fraud and misrepresentation in deals between users 
already, with such risks likely increasing as virtual worlds become increasingly 
commodified, and it becomes easier to engage in trades with other users.227  
  The ability to sue other users in contract or tort should not be unlimited, however, 
as unlimited litigation rights could lead to users turning to the law to resolve disputes 
better left in-world, such as the infamous hypothetical of a user suing regarding the theft 
of a an item in a virtual world where users are allowed to steal items.228 As a result, there 
will have to be some measure of recognition that this in rem right only applies to user-
actions that “break the game,” such as hacks of servers to steal virtual property.229 In the 
same sense, there would need to be some understanding within the judiciary that users 
                                                 
225 See Alfred F. Conard, Easement Novelties, 30 CAL. L. REV. 125, 138-39 (1942). 
226 See Niva Elkin-Koren, What Contracts Cannot Do: The Limits of Private Ordering in Facilitating a 
Creative Commons, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 375, 377 (2005) 
227 See Law and Liberty, in STATE OF PLAY, supra note 9, at 93; Station Exchange, supra note 111. 
228 See Right to Play, STATE OF PLAY, supra note 9, at 73 
229 See Saunders, supra note 42, at 233. 
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could not sue the platform owner for crafting code that indirectly resulted in loss or 
damage of virtual property.230  
 
E. Virtual Numerus Clausus  
 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, while the virtual easement would apply to 
some virtual worlds, its attributes would not be inherently universal. Instead, just as 
property law has a set number property interests available for use, a concept known as the 
Numerus Clausus,231 the virtual easement would also have a small, finite number of 
forms from which companies could choose, with some amount of external limitations. 
Specifically, game companies would, while creating their virtual worlds, effectively 
choose from a number of pre-determined property interest schemes that would apply to 
all users within the world, a concept that, in terms of virtual worlds, has been described 
as interration.232 For fantasy MMORPG’s where the primary purpose of the virtual world 
is to provide an atmosphere for adventure, exploration, and amusement, the virtual 
easement could be minimal in nature, possibly to the extent that the current EULA-ruled 
system is kept entirely in force and users have zero or near-zero rights. In contrast, virtual 
worlds where economic trading and the acquisition of virtual property play a more 
significant or even primary role in why users are involved would presumably have the 
virtual easement in full. In fairness, however, it must be noted that there are many 
different reasons why users choose to participate in a virtual world. It is not 
                                                 
230 Such as the creation of non-user avatars which maim and/or rob users’ avatars—while it is possible that 
proximate cause itself could be a sufficient remedy to this danger, it would be better to prevent courts from 
even reaching the question. The exact dimensions of the in rem right will likely have to be determined only 
after additional study of how the virtual easement worked in practice, however. 
231 See Numerus Clausus, supra note 175. 
232 See Right to Play, STATE OF PLAY, supra note 9, at 78-82; Law and Liberty, in STATE OF PLAY, supra 
note 9, at 107-13. 
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inconceivable, or even unlikely, that some users log-on to fantasy MMORPG’s to gain 
virtual property for profit,233 while others focus on exploration within primarily economic 
virtual worlds. Yet, the system is best structured not to individual users but the 
community as a whole for purposes of notice, so some generalizations of the users’ 
reasons for joining the virtual world will have to be made in each instance. 
 Yet, there should be some limits to the amount of choice that platform owners 
will have over the strength of the virtual easement; instead, one factor in determining the 
nature of virtual easements for specific worlds will depend on the degree to which trading 
and property acquisition are core elements of the world. For a world like Second Life, for 
instance, where purchasing and acquiring property is critical to the world’s structure, it is 
difficult to see anything but the full virtual easement being applied.  
The primary reason for this stance is that, if left to their own devices, it is fairly 
likely that all platform owners will choose the least level of property protection 
regardless of the attributes of their virtual worlds.234 Already, there is strong evidence of 
market failure within the Metaverse. There relatively few major virtual worlds in 
existence, nor are there likely to be more in the near future given the massive startup and 
marketing costs associated with virtual worlds, making it unlikely that an enterprising 
band of users could easily create a new virtual world that can be accessed by the general 
population while having more detailed rights for users. By the same token, there is little 
difference between the EULA’s of the various virtual worlds.235 Such uniformity, 
although allowed in the law, has come to be seen by some scholars as psychologically 
                                                 
233 Indeed, this is the essence of “gold farming.” See Julian Dibbell, supra note 47, at 141. 
234 See Virtual Liberty, supra note 58, at 2090 (suggesting that it will be important to consider the degree to 
which virtual space is a marketplace or “a nexus of transactions that have real world values” as well as 
whether the world is offered as a space for free exchange of ideas). 
235 See supra note 53. 
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exploitative since they actually discourage individual bargaining; by all accounts, the 
companies have no desire to bargain in any way, shape, or form with their users based on 
past actions.236  After all, when a user breaks a rule, the default is termination from the 
system, not the initiation of arbitration or negotiation with the accused user.  
There is little in the way of credible commitment as well, especially considering 
that a company in dire straits could find a case infusion by banning a user for unjust 
reasons and selling their virtual possessions.  Since the only barrier to that is reputational 
damage to the game, a wily company could simply watch for dubious behavior by users 
that could at least theoretically be construed as forbidden and err on the side of 
punishment rather than mercy. Such a scenario is ripe for abuse. Additionally, the 
inability of most users to easily extract all their virtual possessions from one world and 
move to another that seems to be better run is a major market inefficiency preventing a 
virtual world from easily benefiting from positive changes to its infrastructure and user-
company relations.  Once a user has sunk a significant amount of costs into one virtual 
world, she will be very loathe to move to a different one even if the company adopts new 
measures that are objectively tyrannical, such as a major hike in user fees or forcing users 
to pay if they wish to have the highest possible bandwidth for all data connections.  Even 
in a world like Second Life, which does make it possible for users to easily “cash their 
chips out” of the system by converting all Linden dollars into U.S. dollars, it is practically 
impossible for reputational cachet and social relationships to carry over into another 
                                                 
236 See Jason Scott Johnston, Boilerplate in Consumer Contract: The Return of Bargain: An Economic 
Theory of How Standard-Form Contracts Enable Cooperative Negotiation Between Businesses and 
Consumers, 104 MICH. L. REV. 857, 864 (2006). 
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world, further discouraging users from leaving the world. Given these concerns, virtual 
worlds are unlikely to be explained by a Tiebout hypothesis.237  
As can be gleaned from the use of the term Numerus Clausus, companies would 
not be allowed to make a choice from outside the list of predetermined options—in other 
words, using the menu would be mandatory.  If every individual virtual world operator 
were allowed to choose their own set of property rights for users, the result would be 
chaos.  Yet, as referenced above, there will also have to be some amount of oversight on 
companies’ choices within the menu so that virtual worlds operators do not choose 
regimes that are inappropriate for certain virtual worlds.  If, for example, the owner of a 
virtual world centered on fiscal interactions chose an option with zero or near-zero 
property rights, the entire goal of establishing the virtual easement would be thwarted and 
the status quo would remain unchanged.   
In the interests of clarity, the following example may be helpful.  Assume that a 
new virtual world has been created, one that allows users to have property within the 
world and even has a currency exchange between the virtual world and the analog world.  
The owner would then sit down and be forced to choose from the predetermined menu of 
property user rights.  For the sake of this hypothetical, assume that there are five options 
listed on the menu: 1) no user rights, 2) intellectual property rights for users; 3) partial 
property rights for users, such that all user accounts in excess of $2000 must be 
compensated; 4) no property may be taken from a user without just compensation; and 5) 
no property can be taken from a user without just compensation, and the user has the 
right to challenge the companies decision to take the property in some type of 
                                                 
237 See Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956). 
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proceeding.238 Although the owner might wish to choose the first option, his attorney 
would inform him that the first two options are for virtual worlds that have minimal user 
asset accumulation, and his virtual world cannot choose those options.  Faced with the 
remaining three options, the owner chooses option four believing that it will encourage 
users with less money to enter his virtual world and that the administrative requirements 
of the fifth option will cost too much money. 
 To be fair, it has been suggested that the problem could be largely remedied by 
individual users contracting with companies.  If a user could contract with a company to 
allow a form of “insurance,” one that would give the user all monetary value of his 
account upon the company’s termination/acquisition of the account for any reason, that 
would solve many of the current problems.  It is highly doubtful that the companies 
would individually contract with users given that there is a dearth of information 
available to companies about the identity of their users.  Prior to logging on, it is just 
about impossible for a company to have any idea how that user will act within the 
world—a convicted murderer playing from a prison terminal could be entirely 
upstanding, while a banker might access a virtual world to feed a rebellious or even 
sadistic streak.  Even assuming that companies do allow such individual contracting, 
there would be problems with such an incomplete system. First, users could purchase 
such insurance and take that as a license to engage in mayhem the worlds and the 
uninsured.  Second, given the arguments of Alan Schwartz, it is likely that the insurance 
scheme would be undercompensatory for users.239 Finally, this system effectively forces 
                                                 
238 Note, these are not meant to indicate how the menu might look, but is merely a hypothetical menu.  
Ideally, the menu should not be too long or unwieldy, but it would be perfectly reasonable for the menu to 
have between ten and fifteen options available. 
239 See supra note 135. 
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all the costs onto the users, since the company would have to expend no additional 
resources on this system but would instead pocket a potentially sizable sum of cash for 
doing nothing.  As a result, a company may begin to discriminate against the uninsured 
by viewing users according to two different standards based on whether or not they own 
insurance.  In such a system, it is easy to imagine virtual worlds not terminating the 
insured except for severely harmful actions since the infringing user would be 
compensated upon termination.  In contrast, the company would both gain the in-world 
resources of a terminated uninsured user while also further deterring users from declining 
insurance This outcome effectively makes insurance mandatory. 
 Of course, it is possible that efficient distribution of different kinds of virtual 
easements across the Metaverse could be achieved largely through market forces, 
incentives like lower taxes on company profits, or refusal to allow trading for some 
interrations, but given the degree to which the virtual easement in its strongest form 
would change the dynamics of user-company relations, such incentives may not be 
enough.240 Considering that a major reason for establishing the virtual easement would be 
to increase efficiency of property interactions, to allow platform owners to thwart this 
goal for their own benefit would be a depressing outcome.241 
To summarize, while companies will have some manner of choice as to which 
type of virtual easement their world will utilize, they will be forced to have some minimal 
kind of virtual easement.  In other words, there would be a set number of options that 
virtual world platform owners could choose between.  While it would be at least possible 
                                                 
240 See Law and Liberty, in STATE OF PLAY, supra note 9, at 109-10. 
241 See Numerus Clausus, supra note 175, at 38 (“From a social point of view, the objective should be to 
minimize the sum of measurement (and error) costs, frustration costs, and administrative costs. In other 
words, what we want is not maximal standardization—or no standardization—but optimal standardization. 
Fortunately, standardization comes in degrees.”). 
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for a platform owners to select a different option after the virtual world has been 
operating, there would be significant barriers to reducing the rights of users so as to 
prevent bait-and-switch situations. 
Of course, it is possible that the minimum level of protection will be the status 
quo: virtual property controlled by licenses that are revocable at any time.242  To prevent 
platform owners from taking advantage of the menu system and simply choosing the 
option that gives them the maximum amount of rights, it will likely become necessary to 
have a governmental agency monitor and referee the menu to ensure that platform owners 
operate in good faith.  For instance, if a virtual world is focused on trading, a la Second 
Life, and its owner tries to select an option that would give users far too few rights, the 
governmental agency may refuse to allow it to operate until the platform owners picks a 
different option on the menu.  The reason for this is that, as noted previously, companies 
seem to have an incentive to not adopt the virtual easement unless they are forced to by a 
third-party.   
In fairness, however, the above-referenced menu system is not the only potential 
solution. If it could be shown that some companies would adopt the virtual easement 
voluntarily, thereby placing market pressures on other firms to follow suit, the virtual 
easement could be a default rather than a menu system.243 For the default position to 
work, however, it must also be shown that users would have sufficient ability to 
determine which virtual worlds offer robust property rights and which do not.  If users 
                                                 
242 In other words, the first option in the hypothetical above. See supra pp. 59. 
243 Unfortunately, we currently lack data that would speak to this question. 
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have difficulty gaining information, then the above menu regime would be preferred.244  
Notably, since the outcome manner of default system would look little different from the 
above menu system, the only reason this situation is to be preferred is that it would 
definitely not require the existence of a governmental oversight agency. As referenced 
earlier,245 the communicative nature of virtual worlds should make it fairly easy for 
information to be generated about the policies of various worlds.  There is, however, the 
additional problem of switching costs;246 users may be unwilling to change to a new 
virtual world due to differences in social infrastructure and sunk costs within one virtual 
world.  In such a scenario, a menu regime may be necessitated even where companies’ 
incentives make the promulgation of default rules feasible. Additionally, the default 
system would likely not have a finite number of kinds of virtual easement, meaning that 
the default system would be far more chaotic and confusing than the menu version. Given 
the low likelihood of companies adopting the virtual easement, however, it seems like the 
menu system will have to be instituted. 
 While some of the ultimate dimensions of the virtual easement will have to be 
decided after further analysis of the economics and societies of virtual worlds, creating a 
set of virtual easements for a number of virtual worlds that are transferable, long-lasting, 
based on a liability rule, and enforceable between third parties should have substantial 
positive effects. Beyond giving greater clarity to what users’ property rights are within 
virtual worlds generally, giving users some modicum of rights over their virtual property 
                                                 
244 This kind of system has been dubbed the “protection strategy,” since it “can impose a rule that favors the 
uninformed party in order to reduce that party’s need for information gathering.”  Id. at 805.  This is a 
contrast to the “notice strategy” which seeks to facilitate the generation of information.   
245 See supra note 108. 
246 Defined as “the costs of switching from one standard to another. They play a role in determining 
whether a product or service becomes an enduring standard.” Brant T. Lee, The Network Effects of 
Whiteness, 53 AM. U.L. REV. 1259, 1282 (2004). 
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should spur further investment within virtual worlds by users, helping the worlds to 
continue to grow. Similarly, the virtual easement would defeat many of the moral and 
philosophical quandaries of the status quo, with users able to more fully develop 
identities within virtual worlds. Finally, offering a legal standard for user property also 
makes it more feasible for governments to begin taxing income derived from profits 
made within virtual worlds, thereby filling a current gap in the relationship between the 
analog world and virtual worlds. 
 
V. Policy Concerns 
 Though the current state of virtual worlds is precarious in terms of virtual 
property and the virtual easement seems to offer an excellent answer to the question of 
what is to be done about virtual property, establishing the virtual easement is not without 
potential dangers. 247 First, there is the question of whether it is necessary to establish the 
virtual easement now, when virtual worlds are still in their infancy and the problems are 
still being discovered; with the situation in flux, companies have an incentive to be 
nervous about radical change. Also, there is the concern that creating anything 
resembling property rights within virtual worlds will destroy the game conceit and rob 
virtual worlds of much of their fantasy, reducing them to just a digital version of the 
analog world. Another complaint is on jurisdictional lines—how can virtual worlds be 
regulated at all given that not only do they not “exist” in a physical sense within any one 
                                                 
247 Of course, these dangers exist in large part due to the nature of companies’ incentives at present.  For 
instance, the fact that virtual worlds remain in flux militates against radical change to the structural of 
virtual property unless such a change is critical for continued prosperity.  For more, please see discussion 
supra notes 72-81 and accompanying text. 
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country since a virtual world owner could place their servers anywhere in the world. 
From a legal perspective, there is also the question of whether property rights can be 
created in this regard at all, since the establishment of the virtual easement simply takes 
intellectual property and attempts to make it into actual property. This Part will address 
each of these concerns in turn. 
 
A. Necessity 
Although Marc Bragg has filed suit against Linden Lab and there have been a 
handful of examples of users of various virtual worlds seeking damages from owners of 
virtual worlds in the courts,248 it must be noted that such situations are the very rare 
exception rather than the norm. In fact, the most troubling conflict between a user and a 
virtual world owner from a property rights perspective, the arbitrary ejectment of a virtual 
world user for no good reason and the confiscating of his property, seems to be an even 
rarer proposition. As Prof. Alfred Conard notes,  
It is evidence that the conception of a proprietor arbitrarily expelling a patron is a legal 
fiction. Proprietors very rarely expel patrons who are not violating established rules, or 
suspected of it, despite their legal privilege to do so. On the other hand, proprietors do 
exclude patrons on a variety of grounds which are not always reasonable.249 
Cyberproperty, moreover, is not without ills since, by its very nature, it can have a 
chilling effect on speech and the general public nature of online communities, making it 
easier for virtual worlds to resemble a patchwork of individual homesteads rather than 
interconnected holistic communities of millions.250  In this regard, enacting a major 
                                                 
248 See supra pp. 9-10. 
249 Amusement Patron, supra note 95, at 816. 
250 See Against Cyberproperty, supra note 125, at 22. 
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reform of the structure of virtual worlds at this stage instead of applying existing legal 
regimes could do more harm than good to virtual worlds by increasing legal confusion 
within courts,251 with the establishment of the virtual easement possibly leading to an 
unwanted explosion of user property rights at the expense of platform owners.252 
 Such concerns, while understandable, do not provide sufficient reason for 
forgoing the establishment of the virtual easement, however. First, although the virtual 
easement would represent a marked change, it is not one that has been totally 
unexpected—for the last decade, analysts have argued that the internet and online spaces 
must be governed by a mix of contract and property.253 Additionally, while there have 
been relatively few examples of clear legal claims involving virtual worlds as of yet, this 
may be less due to the inherent stability of the system and more due to the relative youth 
of virtual worlds in general. As the total population of the Metaverse and the size of 
virtual world economies increase, it is likely that the number of legal conflicts over 
virtual property will multiply in number and degree. Additionally, it can be argued that 
the inability of users to own property is already having a dampening effect on virtual 
world economies, as users are reluctant to effectively gamble their money on virtual 
property. Even though the economies of virtual worlds have grown dramatically in the 
last few years, it is conceivable that this growth would have been even more pronounced 
if users had a degree of ownership over their virtual world assets.   
                                                 
251 See Nelmark, supra note 30, at 22 (arguing that it is dangerous to create sui generis rules which initially 
provide a better fit for new forms of property but often address a specific act, such as cybersquatting, 
“without considering the broader implications of the law”); Joseph H. Sommer, Against Cyberlaw, 15 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1145, 1148 (2000) (“[M]ost legal doctrines are flexible and likely to accommodate 
new social practices . . . .”). 
252 See Against Cyberproperty, supra note 125, at 24. 
253 See Maureen O’Rourke, Fencing Cyberspace: Drawing Borders in a Virtual World, 82 MINN. L. REV. 
609, 686-87 (1998). 
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Although such situations as Marc Bragg’s may be rare, that also is little reason 
that the law should attempt to avoid them; if anything, the fact that avoiding the area until 
a difficult case appears before a prominent court is a more frightening proposition, since, 
without guidance, it is very foreseeable that the outcome of such a case could be 
displeasing to all parties. Finally, while some scholars do believe that the current system 
is sustainable, the vast majority believe that a deluge of litigation over virtual property is 
coming,254 and that clear guidelines for courts to use in considering cases on virtual 
property would be critical for working out the dimensions of virtual property rights.255 




                                                 
254 See, e.g., Laws, supra note 7, at 50-52; Raph Koster, Declaring the Rights of Players, in STATE OF PLAY, 
supra note 9, at 55, 66-67; Right to Play, in STATE OF PLAY, supra note 9, at 83-84; Virtual Liberty, supra 
note 58, at 2045. 
255 See Laws, supra note 7, at 51. Without clear guidelines, it is entirely possible that differing jurisdictions 
could develop different property rights standards, an outcome which could be potentially disastrous since 
the level of transaction costs could become astronomical. 
256 Admittedly, one could respond to this point by asking why no virtual world has yet attempted to create 
full property rights given the risks at issue.  There seem to be a number of animating factors behind this 
decision.  First, while conflict is extremely likely in the future, cases like Bragg’s remain the exception, and 
there has yet to be a smoking gun case similar to A&M Records v. Napster that crystallizes the issue for 
observers. 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).  Until this case appears, many in the industry may well prefer 
willful ignorance to taking significant action.  By the same token, it is conceivable that companies are 
making the political calculation that government, if it eventually steps in, will regulate far less than the 
companies would independently, offering further inducement to refrain at the moment.  To some extent, 
there is also an element of risk of mutually assured destruction by enacting property rights, as a company 
could enact greater property rights within a virtual world only to be one-upped the next week by a rival, 
initiating a vicious cycle for the companies. Finally, increased regulation would likely also mean increased 
bureaucracy and costs, concerns that similarly militate against companies increasing their property rights so 
far, just as the high cost of starting a virtual world likely prevents new entities from establishing virtual 
worlds with full property rights that can compete with established players like Blizzard and Sony. See 
Posting of Richard Bartle to Terranova, http://terranova.blogs.com/terra_nova/ (Dec. 16, 2005). 
 Sadly the exact animating factor for the company’s failures to act appears to be difficult to discern 
at this time, yet it does appear unlikely that it is due to some belief in virtual worlds as “public goods” 
given how strenuously the EULA’s seek to claim that companies are complete and total owners of their 
virtual worlds. See supra Part II.A.3. 
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B. Destroying the Game Conceit 
Considering that virtual worlds were birthed largely in fantasy, and that much of 
the Metaverse is comprised of MMORPG’s that either do not have significant 
commodification or could exist without significant commodification,257 the concern that 
the virtual easement could destroy the game conceit is a very real one.258 In fact, it is 
possible that the establishment of the virtual easement in some virtual worlds could have 
an impact even on those virtual worlds which do not increase user property rights by 
underlining just what rights the users of those virtual worlds do not possess.  
Yet, the fact that the virtual easement will not be universally applied and can be 
given multiple interrations should limit many of the especially egregious effects on the 
game conceit. The virtual easement can and should be structured in such a way that if two 
users engage in player-to-player combat, the loser cannot seek redress in a court.259 
Additionally, at a bare minimum, the virtual easement could be interrated to effectively 
create a spectrum of property rights, such that while users in Virtual World A (an 
MMORPG) have no more rights than they have in current EULA’s, users of Virtual 
World B (an MMORPG that encourages property acquisition) could have the long-lasting 
and liability rule dimensions of the virtual easement but not the transferability and in rem 
attributes, while users of Virtual World C (a space that is effectively a place to inhabit 
online) could have the full virtual easement. The concept of a spectrum can also be 
calibrated further, to the point that platform owners could have as much flexibility 
                                                 
257 The key example of the latter situation is Sony’s Everquest II—although the creation of Station 
Exchange has standardized trading between players, such trading is far from germane to the game and 
could be abolished without many negative impacts beyond a loss of additional revenue to Sony and the end 
of players being able to financially profit from being involved in the virtual world. 
258 See Bartle, in STATE OF PLAY, supra note 9, at 40. 
259 See Virtual Liberty, supra note 58, at 2068. 
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determining the virtual property rights of their worlds as individuals have determining 
ownership of real and personal property in the analog world.260 
In some respects then, the establishment of the virtual easement could be seen as 
supplying a sense of order to a subset of virtual worlds—the beginnings of a system of 
systematized order within virtual worlds.  In its most aggressive version, the virtual 
easement simply sets up rules and regulations for companies to follow in dealing with the 
property of users, a situation that can be roughly analogized to the constitutional and 
legal limitations on zoning and eminent domain in the analog world.261  The primary 
differences between real-world zoning and the use of eminent domain lie in the relative 
simplicity of the virtual easement—there are no inherent requirements on when the 
takings clause can be used262 or what the proper metric of a taking is,263 but merely the 
existence of an reimbursement for users when the company desires to take their virtual 
assets.  In other words, while some observers may claim that this represents the death of 
the game conceit, the additional rules on the virtual world are fairly light, and actually 
seek to make a game company’s interactions with its users more standardized.264  It is 
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262 See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 
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if virtual world continue to grow in size, population, and technological detail, it is conceivable that some 
parties, likely users, will eventually move to create a system of “virtual regulatory takings,” wherein 
companies could be required to reimburse users for taking assets unintentionally.  This outcome is the 
specter that Bartle and other writers refer to when discussing the game conceit—the possibility that game 
companies could lose the vast majority of their control on virtual worlds, and that virtual worlds would turn 
into nothing more than an electronic mirror of our analog world.  Yet, this concern is premature and 
resembles fears that providing any sort of regulation to a market entails the destruction of an economy.  At 
present, the possibility of such an outcome occurring anytime in the near or moderate future is 
infinitesimal, as there are currently no persons advocating such a system at all.  The subject, however, 
would be fruitful for further thought by members of the academy. 
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even conceivable that the existence of the virtual easement could make it easier for 
companies to “re-zone” their virtual worlds. After all, while game companies may be 
reluctant to simply take the assets of users without compensation for fear of increasing 
user ire, the possibility of compensation for lost assets should help pacify such users. 
 The concern over damage to the game conceit at the hands of the virtual easement 
is already largely being rendered moot by current events, however, as platform owners 
are attempting to reap large economic benefits off of users while maintaining total control 
of all virtual property.265 Both Second Life’s decision to grant intellectual property rights 
to users and Sony’s establishment of its Station Exchange auction system represent large 
moves away from the vision of virtual worlds as primarily play spaces without any 
concomitant change in users’ rights. As such, the virtual easement may mitigate some of 
these trends and help preserve the game conceit for some virtual worlds by forcing game 
companies to make a choice—either accept the virtual easement, meaning that the 
companies can continue profiting off of individual transactions between users, or 
continue the EULA system but without the ability to profit off of user-user 
trades/auctions.  
 
C. Jurisdictional Concerns   
 Although it can be argued that virtual worlds can be said to effectively reside in 
whatever jurisdiction their servers are located in, the generally nebulous connection 
between the analog world and cyberspace space generally makes precise regulation of 
                                                 
265 See Virtual Liberty, supra note 58, at 2071, 2073; Law and Liberty, in STATE OF PLAY, supra note 9, at 
94-95. 
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virtual worlds a fairly daunting task.266 Yet, even assuming that virtual world companies 
attempt to escape the establishment of a virtual easement system of property rights by 
moving their servers to a different country,267 it should still be possible for the United 
States to regulate the activities of users who are United States citizens. If nothing else, the 
recent legislation passed by Congress regulating online poker websites provides 
precedent for the United States regulating the activities of foreign websites with regard to 
United States citizen users. As a result, if the virtual easement were established, courts 
could make platform owners choose between accepting that United States citizen users 
have property rights over their virtual world assets to some degree and not allowing 
United States citizens to enter their virtual world. Although the latter outcome would be 
quite deleterious, the size of the virtual world user base in the United States militates 
against this outcome. 
 
D. The Possibility of Creating Property Through IP 
  Finally, although the relationship between intellectual property (IP) and property 
has not always been particularly well-defined,268 the virtual easement takes that 
relationship in a somewhat revolutionary new direction by suggesting that users can take 
code which only appears to be a piece of property and grant it many of the same rights as 
real property. In the most extreme sense, the virtual easement can be critiqued for 
                                                 
266 Gregory J. Wrenn, Cyberspace Is Real, National Borders Are Fiction: The Protection of Expressive 
Rights Online Through Recognition of National Borders in Cyberspace, 38 STAN. J INT'L L. 97 (2002). 
267 A rather remote scenario given the wealth of tech-friendly resources located in the United States and the 
fact that other especially tech-saavy countries, like South Korea and China, are moving in the same 
direction. See, e.g., Online Gamer in China Wins Virtual Theft Suit, REUTERS, Dec. 20, 2003, available at 
http://www.cnn.com/2003/TECH/fun.games/12/19/china.gamer.reut/. 
268 While intellectual property is the realm of “abstract proprietary interests in the intangible” and property 
is the law of the tangible, the divide between them is often quite narrow. ROGER E. SCHECHTER & JOHN R. 
THOMAS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THE LAW OF COPYRIGHTS, PATENTS, AND TRADEMARKS 4-9 (2003). 
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allowing for a user to take a part of a copyright (some part of a virtual world’s overall 
code) and create property rights effectively out of thin air (by claiming a measure of 
property rights over that piece of code). Yet, it must be noted that virtual property itself is 
somewhat distinct from intellectual property—although virtual property may be, at base, 
code, a piece of virtual property shares many significant attributes with real property, like 
exclusivity, transferability, and even a degree of tangibility. More importantly, people 
interact with virtual property not in the abstract way they deal with intellectual property 
but in a fairly concrete manner—indeed, users interactions with virtual property are 
giving a new normative dimension to how intellectual property can be perceived.269 As 
such, if the primary barrier to perceiving virtual property as being worthy of property 
rights is its existence as code, this is not by itself a problem—after all, “the law turns the 




Although virtual worlds have managed to exist largely outside the law for the first 
few years of their existence, that period seems to be drawing to a close. At present, the 
status quo of virtual property appears largely untenable, with the EULA-controlled 
system of rights management likely to be increasingly challenged by users in courts. As 
neither property law nor contract law appear able to provide by themselves a good system 
to control the ownership of virtual property, however, it appears that the best solution to 
                                                 
269 See Elkin-Koren, supra note 226, at 395; Margaret Jane Radin, Regulation by Contract, Regulation by 
Machine, 160 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 142 (2004). 
270 See FREE CULTURE, supra note 32, at 82. 
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the virtual property question is to create a new interest that combines different aspects of 
contract law and property law—the virtual easement.  
As previously mentioned, although the broad strokes of the virtual easement have 
been described, much work remains to be done before the virtual easement’s form(s) 
should be ultimately finalized. Beyond analyzing how the U.S. government should 
consider enacting the virtual easement and what, if any, cooperation should occur 
between countries in this regard, a great deal more research about the economies of 
virtual worlds would be very useful so as to maximize the efficiency of the worlds. 
Moreover, any establishment of virtual property rights will have to be workable within 
the virtual worlds, so further studies of users’ opinions on this subject and the existence 
of virtual worlds in general would be useful—although “online democracy” within virtual 
worlds is still fairly nascent, users have begun fairly ferocious movements when faced 
with what they believe are illogical or unjust policies. 
Although the novel technical nature of virtual worlds might fill some in the 
academy with pause about how the law should deal with the question of virtual property, 
it should be remembered that the law has dealt with novel technologies before. Though 
an improper regulation of virtual worlds could damage the Metaverse gravely, the 
greatest danger is not that governments or courts will enact poor laws but that no action 
will be taken in the belief that an appropriate system of virtual property rights will work 
itself out naturally.271 In the relatively near future,272 a court or a legislature will attempt 
                                                 
271 Lawrence Lessig, Op-Ed., Make Way for Copyright Chaos, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2007, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/18/opinion/18lessig.html?_r=2&n=Top%2fOpinion%2fEditorials%20an
d%20Op%2dEd%2fOp%2dEd%2fContributors&oref=slogin&oref=login. 
272 Considering that Marc Bragg’s lawsuit has been transferred to federal court and has survived a motion 
to dismiss, it’s even possible that this very first suit could itself be the tsunami that inaugurates the 
regulation of property rights within virtual worlds. See Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., No. 06-4925 (E.D. 
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to regulate the use, sale, and ownership of virtual property.273  Although it may seem 
somewhat counterintuitive, establishing a system of virtual property rights before that 
happens may well be the best way to guarantee that the one of the most remarkable 
innovations of cyberspace is able to meet its potential.  
                                                                                                                                                 
Pa. May. 30, 2007) (order denying motion for summary judgment), 
http://www.nylawyer.com/adgifs/decisions/101507robreno.pdf. 
273 See Law and Liberty, in STATE OF PLAY, supra note 9, at 112-13. 
